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51 Introduction
The legality of modern institutions relies on justifications. The will of oligarchs is no
longer persuasive to civil society. Democratic representation, government, law,
etc, try to justify their establishment on the acceptance by the reasoning inherent in
human mind. Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs), which take the form of property
rights guaranteed by the monopoly privilege, are also keen to seek justification as
enthusiastic as other institutions do.
Western political and economic culture provides basic justification for IPRs both
in the deontological way by Locke’s Labour Theory and Hegel’s Liberty Theory,
and in the consequentialist way by economic utility theories. Since the theoretical
basis as the premise of the justification is not without question, the conclusion is
also sceptical, especially to the developing and least developed countries who are
mainly of non-western political culture. The attitudes of them towards the IPRs
are half support and half fear in light of different effects of IPRs protection.
However, the economic globalisation promoted by international trade does not
want to leave the developing and least developed countries alone and let them to
make their own legislations and policy choices according to their developing
levels. Instead, globalisation calls for the international harmonization of IPRs
protection.
The task of harmonization is achieved by several international IPRs conventions,
through national treatment principle and few substantive provisions. However, the
landmark treaty in this field is the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPS Agreement),1 adopted by the Uruguay
                                                
1 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C of the
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, adopted on 15 April
1994, LT/UR/A-1C/IP/1.
6Round negotiation of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The TRIPS
Agreement is not satisfied with non-discrimination treatment but also establishes
substantive protection standards as well as enforcement mechanism. Therefore,
the aim of the Agreement seems to be ambitious as to the very different IPRs
protection levels of the members.
How did the Agreement achieve the compromise of all members? In addition to
incorporating the pre-TRIPS IPRs conventions, including their methods to limit
the exclusive rights conferred to the IPRs holder, the TRIPS Agreement seeks a
solution from the trade-off among the rest on the agenda of negotiation round,
e.g. agricultural products, textile and tropical products. As the Agreement
provides the availability, scope, and duration of IPRs protection, it also limits the
exercise of these substantive rights for the purposes of balancing private rights and
public interest, as well as balancing the demands of Intellectual Property (IP)
import and export countries.
However, even embodying the limitation on the protection, there is still no
consensus on certain issues such as the subject matter of protection, the
international exhaustion of IPRs, the status of biotechnologies, the novelty and
non-obviousness standards of patentability. These areas also extend to the exact
scope of exclusive rights, as well as the exceptions to the rights. For instance, it is
disputable whether a country must declare a national health emergency to invoke
compulsory licensing. When the hot issues could not be resolved during the
negotiation, the TRIPS negotiators adopted a drafting technique to achieve the
general agreement, that is, leaving these issues open-ended and allowing a certain
level of flexibility in interpretation and application.
In the regime of the TRIPS Agreement, flexibility occurs as a way of permitting
agreement without full resolution in hard legal cases, providing no specific content
                                                                                                                           
7for many labels of IPRs issues and offering neither objective nor positive
definitions for many notions of IPRs. Consequently, although there may be certain
convergence on basic rights granted, the precision of the protection conferred by
the Agreement remains unclarified. Under the Agreement, applicability of the
TRIPS-mandated rights can be interpreted more or less expansively depending
on the role ascribed to the specific list of examples (representative or exhaustive)
and the requisite level of novelty imposed. This outcome is precisely what would
be expected in an international agreement driven by parties having enough
negotiating leverage to force agreement but inadequate power to prevail fully.
Disagreements are sufficiently masked to permit signing an accord.
Inspired by the Doha Ministerial Conference of the WTO, which reaffirmed and
clarified certain flexibility in the TRIPS Agreement, this thesis undertakes to
explore the flexible areas inherent in the text of the TRIPS Agreement with regard
mainly to patent protection. The purpose of this exploration is to provide the law-
makers of different countries, especially developing and least developed countries
(LDC), a framework as to the interpretation and application of the Agreement.
A main challenge to the present thesis is how to justify the flexible interpretation
and application in the light of international obligation conferred by a treaty, and
how to show a good faith in the process of interpretation and application.
Therefore, most arguments during the exploration of flexibility are very keen to
defend their legality under international law. As a matter of fact, arguments in this
thesis are not merely to clarify which areas in the TRIPS Agreement leave room
of flexibility to the members, but also to draw a boundary line of the flexible room
and point out where there is a non-flexibility zone.
82 Dialectics and Harmonization
of IPRS
2.1 Dialectics of IPRS
2.1.1 Controversy of the Justification of IPRs
Justification of an institution is usually double-folded: deontological and
consequentialist.2 A deontological justification is provided when it is shown that it
enforces certain rights which persons acting within the scope of a certain
institution are entitled to; a consequentialist justification of an institution arises
when it is shown that its working brings about valuable consequence, like well-
being, efficiency, etc.3 The deontological justification of IPRs can be derived from
John Locke’s Labour Theory of property acquisition and Hegel’s Liberty Theory
of self-identity. The consequentialist justification of IPRs lies on the economic
utility. Controversy exists in both way of justification and challenges the legality of
the IPRs.
Locke’s Labour Theory can be regarded as the union of two basic themes. First,
everyone has a property right in the labour of his own body. Second, the
appropriation of an unowned object arises out of the application of human labour
to that object.4 Therefore morally, a person has a natural right to possess IP,
                                                
2 For the deontological and consequentialist justificatory theories, see Raz, Joseph, The
Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), ch. 11.
3 For instance, the 17th century’s theory of natural rights offers a deontological justification
of human rights, according to which human rights are derived from human nature. On the
other hand, the 19th century’s utilitarianism can be seen as an instance of a consequentialist
justification, which provides grounds for legal institutions by arguing that the working of
such institutions produces the greatest happiness of the greatest number.
4 Locke, John, ‘‘The Second Treatise’’, Two Treatises on Government, ed. Laslett, Peter,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 305-306.
9which is the product of his brain. Society is obliged to reward person to the extent
that he has produced: as one sows, so should one reap.
However, this justification suffers from some difficulties. If the intelligent labour
employed by a person does not offer the total value of an IP product but merely
adds some new value to an existing product, like innovation, the Labour Theory
does not explain the ownership over the whole product.5 The history of science,
technology and literature illustrates that people cannot make any invention,
innovation or literal works without the intellectual heritage from ancestors. In
many events, they develop a small step but achieve the whole right over the IP.
Hegel’s Liberty Theory holds that property is, among other things, the means by
which an individual could objectively express a personal, singular will.6 Civil
Society is an environment in which an individual aspires to establish a unique place
of liberty, and property is the vehicle by which one’s self-identity is
acknowledged by others who are similarly striving for self-identity. The individual
and society is in a relationship that is at least partially adversarial and civil society
is a constraining environmental for individuals aspiring to establish unique moral
meaning. An individual tries to establish and protect his self-identity through
voluntary exchange of property, which represents the individual’s will. Society is
thus very limited in its right to prevent an individual’s fair accumulation, holding,
and dispensation of property. The needs of a society per se would not justify
taking an individual’s property — including property in the form of ideas —
without fair compensation.
However, many non-western political cultures do not assume an adversarial
relationship between individual and society. Islamic and some African cultures go
so far as to define self-identity not according to individual liberty but according to
                                                                                                                           
5  Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 174.
6 ‘‘In Property, a person exists for the first time as a reason’’. See Hegel, Georg W. F.,
Philosophy of Right, translated with notes by Knox, Thomas M. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1942), p. 235-236.
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the individual’s relationship with and contribution to the society.7 Therefore, a
right is not a function for individual good, and the concept of property is hence
different: if individual’s liberty is not the basis for self-identity, then the moral
foundations of property rights must rest somewhere else.
The consequentialist justification of IPRs lies on the economic motivation. IPRs,
especially patent, grant a right holder a temporary monopoly over the use of the
invention or the reproduction of a work, and prevent competitors from sharing or
using their knowledge without payment. This enables the right holder to recoup his
labour and secure his economic interests and, thus encourage the research and
creative act. The degree of protection afforded to IPRs has an impact on the
profits gained by the inventors and writers, and without the protection of the
IPRs, much research and creativity would not be carried out.8
But this is also only partly true. No doubt less creative activity would occur
without IPRs, but how much less and in what areas? In the centuries before the
patent system was established or enforced, inventive and creative work had also
flourished. Empirical evidence shows that protection of patent is needed not so
much to promote inventions,9 but to provide an incentive to engage in costly
research and development (R&D) activities which turn pure knowledge into
innovative products or process that can be used in industry. Further more, from
the economic point of view, the IP product often has the characteristics of a
public good.10 That is, the value of a patent will not be diminished by the
                                                                                                                           
7  African philosophy of self-identity could be summed up as, ‘‘I am because we are, and
because we are therefore I am.’’ See Mbiti, John S., Africa Religions and Philosophy, 2nd
edition (Greenwood, 1992).
8 Spector, Haracio M., ‘‘An outline of a Theory Justifying Intellectual and Industrial
Property Rights’’, Intellectual Property, ed. Drahos, Peter, in The International Library of
Essays in Law and Legal Theory, ed. Campbell, Tom D., 2nd Series (Aldershot: Dartmouth
and Ashgate, 1999), p. 536-537.
9 Gutterman, Alan, and Brown, Robert, Intellectual Property Laws of East Asia (Hong kong,
Signapore: Sweet and Maxwell Asia, 1997), p. 16-21.
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consumption of the patented product or process, and the marginal cost of
disseminating knowledge is often zero. Consequently, from the standpoint of
efficiency, the optimal allocation of resources requires that such goods have a
zero price. It is true that long-term social benefit of technological development
requires the protection of the IPRs, but it may also entail social costs, including
the consumer’s benefit and later comer’s benefit from free riding.
IPRs are supposed to encourage information to be disclosed to the public and
thus to increase society’s pool of ideas and knowledge. For example, the
condition for the application of a patent is that patented inventions have to be
disclosed, allowing others to study the invention even while its patent is being
protected. This helps the progress, dissemination and transfer of technology. After
a certain period, the protection of exclusive rights expires. This means that the
invention becomes available for others to use, which avoids re-inventing the wheel
and contributes to build a new foundation of human knowledge. But sometimes
the holder of an IPR prefers to impede its dissemination and application. In
general, the broader the scope and the longer the duration of the IPRs, the
stronger the incentive for creating IP products and the weaker the incentive for
disseminating and applying them.
The consequentialist justification of IPRs also argues that countries with strong
patent systems typically experience more rapid economic growth and
development.11 Some economists claim that the level of economic development is
closely correlated with the existing level of IPRs protection, and many developing
countries that failed to implement IPRs protection systems experienced a
correspondingly low level of economic development, as well as a slow evolution
in the size and complexity of their local markets12. These findings suggest the need
                                                                                                                           
10  For the analysis of public good character of IP, see Cooter, Robert, and Ulen, Thomas,
Law and Economics, 3rd edition (Addison Wesley Longman, 2000), p. 128-138.
11 Rapp, Richard T., and Rozek, Richard P., ‘‘Benefits and Costs of Intellectual Property
Protection in developing Countries’’, Journal of World Trade, Vol. 24 (1990), p. 75-81.
12 Gutterman and Brown, see above note 9, p. 16-21.
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for further reforms to existing law as a precondition to continued growth. But in
their research, there is a serious discrepancy between the cause and the effect. Is
it the protection of the IPRs that enhances prosperity or prosperity enhances the
protection of the IPRs? No economist has answered this question convincingly.
2.1.2 The North-South Debate on IPRs Protection
The controversy of the justification of IPRs, together with the different
development levels of the North (technologically advanced countries) and the
South (countries in the process of industrialization), lead to the divergences on
availability, scope and duration of IPRs protection between them. The latter
group has often limited the scope of protection granted to foreign IPRs as part of
its catching-up strategies. Even the current developed countries may also
experience the same policy choice of limited IPRs protection when they were not
so developed. As noted in a report by the Office of Technology Assessment of
the U.S. Congress, when the U.S. was still a relatively young and developing
country it refused to respect foreign IPRs on the grounds that it was freely entitled
to use foreign works to further its social and economic development.13
The latter’s unwillingness to strengthen the protection of IPRs stems from the fact
that at a stage when the technological capacity of a particular country is weak,
and its enterprises are not able to take significant advantage of the incentive
provided by the IPRs protection, the benefits gained from such protection may be
outweighed by the disadvantage of not being able to acquire and adapt foreign
technology without reference to its right holder, or to import new IP products and
processes from alternative or cheaper sources.
                                                                                                                           
13 U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, Intellectual Property Rights in an Age
of Electronic Information, OAT- CIT-3002 (Washington. D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1986), p. 228.
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      A short survey of the North-South debate for different IPRs protection policies
could contribute to the understanding of the gap between these two groups. The
argument of the North for a strong protection of IPRs can be summarized as
following:
                 a. Increased inbound investment and technology transfer. One of the most logical
and practical advantages for developing countries to enhance IPRs protection is
inbound investment and technology transfer from foreign firms. In the past,
concerned about the adequacy of the protection that would be afforded to the
transferred technology, foreign firms limited their technology exports to
developing countries by allowing only older generation technology or outdated
product lines to be transferred.14 Once stronger IPRs protection is enacted, it can
be expected that foreign firms will increase the flow of new technologies to
developing countries, either in the form of direct investment or in the form of
technology transfer. Otherwise, due to the increasing cost of R&D, the
multinational corporations (MNC) will no longer be willing to invest in countries
that fail to offer sufficient IPRs protection.15
                 b. Increased flow of new products. The availability of the protection of IPRs for
new products increases the flow of products, especially into the developing
countries, thereby increasing the welfare of the population. For example, it has
been argued that the decision of countries such as India to deny the product
patent protection for innovation in the food, drug and chemical industries results in
foreign and domestic forfeiture of pharmaceutical research and development
                                                
14 Wolfhard, Eric ‘‘International Trade in Intellectual Property: The Emerging GATT
Regime’’, University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review, Vol. 49 (1990), p. 106, 118. Primo
Braga, Calos A., ‘‘The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights and the GATT: A View
From the South’’, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 22 (1989), p. 243-264. See
also , Pamela, Smith, ‘‘International Patent Protection and United States Exports: Evidence in
the Data’’, paper submitted to the Conference on International Relations of Intellectual
Property: Challenges at the Turn of the Century, Washington D.C.: The American
University, 24-25 April (1995).
15 ‘‘Interview with Brazilian Official on Pharmaceutical Patent Protection’’, Word Intellectual
Property Report, Vol. 5 (1991), p. 128.
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benefits, since then fewer new products are available on the market.16 If this
proposition is true, the effect in the pharmaceutical area is of particular concern,
as the overall level of health in the developing and least developed countries will
ultimately suffer.
                  c. Improvements in local knowledge base. A strong protection of IPRs improves
the knowledge base concerning technical development. Such an improvement
follows from increased imports, licensing activities and patent application filings in
the local market. Technical information cannot be derived simply from reviewing
foreign patent application or from pirating foreign products. The person-to-person
communication that follows from investment activities provides a powerful training
and educational tool for the local workforce. An improved knowledge base is of
great use to local firms in negotiating the terms of licenses with foreign firms. In
addition, it provides a greater appreciation for the availability of alternatives and
the underlying utility of the licensed subject matter.
            d. Reduced enforcement and transaction costs. Welfare gains of the right holder
are realized through a reduction of transaction costs attributable to surveillance,
verification, compliance and enforcement of IPRs. These activities are currently
provided on a unilateral basis, and would become the shared responsibility of all
parties to bilateral or multilateral agreements. An additional reduction would occur
in the transaction costs attributable to reliance upon pirated foreign technology.17
            However, the South become sceptical when the North asserts that strong
protection of IPRs is the proper means to insure economic development. Some of
the concerns of the South regarding IPRs protection can be summarized as
follows:
 a.  Lack of perceived benefits. Although certain developing countries have
nurtured their own domestic industries, most fail to recognize any potential
                                                
16 Rapp and Rozek, see above note 11, p. 75-81.
17 Wolfhard, see above note 14, p. 117.
15
advantages flowing from granting greater IPRs protection. Less prosperous
countries lack the resources necessary for domestic R&D and implementation of
a new patent within a developing country has led to few inventions and fewer
relative benefits. Moreover, developing countries may be unable to bear the loss
of consumer, which is the result of the higher prices stemming from the
monopolization associated with the beginning stages of IPRs development.
Finally, these countries may be unable to bear the start-up and maintenance costs
associated with the development and enforcement of new IPRs, although initially
these costs generally accrue to foreign innovators.
      b.  Under-utilization of inventions and lack of stimulus for ‘‘local-specific’’
products. One of the arguments of the North made in favour of granting the strong
protection to IPRs is its effect of increasing flow of new products and
technologies. However, e.g. the patent products need not to enter the foreign
market in which the patent was granted. Rather, the patent may simply be used as
a means of preventing others from making or selling the product in that market.
As a result, in many cases, the patent system actually leads to the under-utilization
of inventions in the patent granting countries.18 On the other hand, developed
countries create a majority of the patentable inventions and technologies.
Therefore most of the patents granted in developing countries are issued to
foreigners. The largest proportion of inventions covered by patents are included,
not by the availability of patent protection in the developing countries, but rather
by the domestic patent system of the right holder or in conjunction with patent
systems in other developed countries. As a result, a developing country cannot
expect that implementation of a patent regime will induce foreign innovations to
focus their development efforts on new products and technologies that meet the
special needs of the developing countries.
                                                                                                                           
18 Mesevage, Tomas, ‘‘The Carrot and the Stick: Protecting U.S. Intellectual Property in
Developing Countries’’, Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal, Vol. 17 (1990), p.
443.
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      c. Unavailability of essential commodities and damage to autonomy. Developing
countries have, in most cases, adopted some form of IPRs protection. However,
much resistance existing to the establishment of a uniform global standard is
simply to conform to the request of developed countries. For instance, Indian
officials have often expressed a high degree of indignation at the suggestion that
they pursue a course undirected by their own programme of self-reliance and
specific needs. Also, the Chinese government has suggested that ‘‘the level of
protection for IP should keep pace with the economic development of the country
concerned’’.19 Furthermore, regarding the local attitudes toward private property
rights, many countries believe that certain products and technologies must not be
included in any IPRs protection regime. The most common examples are in the
area of pharmaceutical and chemical products. As the Director of the Philippine
Bureau of Patents recently stated, ‘‘developing countries have a need requiring
special preferential attention on patent systems — such as on medicine — to
make it affordable to the poor people’’.20 Similarly, Chinese officials believe that
pharmaceutical products ‘‘are produced for the health of people’’.21 Accordingly,
reproduction should be permitted in order to make the essential commodities
more available. In some countries, the markets for these essential commodities
may actually be controlled by the local governments.
      d. Mixed effect of other factors. Implementation of a patent system does not itself
alone guarantee that foreign investment and technology transfer will increase. A
variety of political, legal, cultural, social and economic factors impact on the
perceived risks of undertaking a particular inbound investment transaction and,
thus, on the level of foreign investment and technology transfer. For example, a
patent life is of little value in a country where the lack of expendable capital
                                                
19 See above note 15, p. 145-146.
20 ‘‘Asia-Pacific Countries Agree to Cooperate on Patent Issues’’, World Intellectual
Property Report Vol. 4 (1990), p. 53.
21 ‘‘China Calls Special 301 Designation Unacceptable, Says Trade Will Suffer’’, World
Intellectual Property Report, Vol. 5 (1991), p. 146.
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impedes the purchase of patented goods. Also, the ability of the patent holder to
successfully commercialise any product depends, not only on the competitive
environment, but also on the ability to effectively market the patented product.
2.1.3 Domestic Legislation and International
Harmonization
According to the analysis above, the justification and strong protection of IPRs is
not without scepticism. Some maintained that infringements of IPRs constituted a
straightforward matter of piracy and theft, just like the infringement of tangible
property rights. However, the nature of IPRs is proprietary rights granted by
monopolistic privileges. Therefore, the protection of IPRs is effected by different
social situations and is more of a policy matter. The core task of the domestic
legislation in this field is to adjust the tension between the private rights of IPRs
holder and the public interest of a society, and the tension between the promotion
of creativity and the decrease of social costs for the IPRs protection. Legislators
attempt to strike a dialectic balance between these concerns at the domestic level.
The result of the balancing depends on whether, in a given point of time,
economic policy places more emphasis on efficiency, aimed at increasing
aggregate wealth, or on equity, aimed at the redistribution of knowledge and
wealth. The availability, scope and duration of IPRs protection respond to the
trade-off between the private interest and public good, as well as the trade-off
between economic efficiency and social welfare.
However, the harmonization of different IPRs protection at the international level
faces more tasks than the domestic legislation. It seems fairly evident that IPRs
protection of same level does not make same sense for all countries in a certain
period. The impacts of enhanced IPRs protection upon developing countries may
vary significantly. There is no priori strong evidence that these countries will
18
necessarily benefit from a reform of their IPRs systems.22 The evidence which has
been put forth regarding the relationship between IPRs and economic
development is unconvincing.23 When seeking an optimal balance between the
need for monopoly and the benefits of free access to knowledge, the governments
also take into consideration the national competitive capacity in IP area and the
redistributive affect of international harmonization. In formulating their IPRs
policies they must reconcile static efficiency considerations (which imply that
knowledge should be free) with the longer-term objective of encouraging
innovation and technological progress.
There is no unique answer to this conundrum. Whether a given policy of IPRs
protection is optimal or not depends on the objectives and circumstances of
countries and the economic sectors involved, and thus conflicts of interest
between countries can easily occur.24 Therefore, the international IPRs
conventions face a common task when they seek to harmonize different IPRs
protection: how to harmonize the controversial rationale of IPRs protection and
different national interest.
2.2 Harmonization of the Paris Convention
The history of multilateral harmonization of IPRs protection can be traced back
over 100 years. In 1883, 11 countries met in Paris and signed the Paris
Convention25. This has since been followed by a number of IPRs conventions in
                                                
22 Correa, Carlos M., and Yusuf, Abdulqawi A., Intellectual Property Rights and
International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement (London: Kluwer Law International, 1998), p. 96.
23 In fact, the rise of Japan and other ‘‘technology importers’’ appears to support the utility
of alternative strategies, at least while the country is in a relatively early stage of
development.
24 Hoekman, Bernard M., and Kostecki, Michel M. Political Economy of the World Trading
System: From GATT To WTO (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 145-147.
25 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, adopted on 20 March 1883,
last revised on 14 July 1967,UNTS Vol. 828, p. 305.
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different IPRs fields, including the 1886 Berne Convention26, 1961 Rome
Convention27, and the 1989 Washington Treaty28. Since 1967, the Paris, Berne
and Rome Conventions have all been administered by the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO), a specialized agency of the United Nations
(UN), based in Geneva.
2.2.1 Non-Discrimination Provisions
The harmonization of the Paris Convention on IPRs protection is based on the
principle of national treatment. Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention contain the
principle of national treatment, under which, each country of the Paris Union is
bound to protect the IPRs of the nationals of other countries in a manner as it
protects its own nationals’ IPRs.29 The national treatment applies to all the
nationals of the countries of the Union, both natural persons and legal entities. It
also extends to the nationals of countries outside the Union, provided they are
domiciled or have an industrial or commercial establishment in a country of the
Union. This principle excludes any possibility of discrimination to the detriment of
nationals of other countries of the Union and any requirement of reciprocity of
protection. That means, suppose a given country has a longer duration of patent
protection than another country of the Union, the former country will not have the
right to provide that nationals of the latter country will only enjoy a shorter
duration of protection as provided in the law of the latter country, if the patent is
in the territory of the former country. This principle applies not only to codified
                                                                                                                           
26 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, adopted on 9
September 1886, last revised on 1 July 1967, UNTS Vol. 828, P. 221.
27 International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms
and Broadcasting Organizations, adopted on 26 October 1961, UNTS Vol. 469, p. 43.
28 Treaty on the Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, adopted on 26 May
1989, ILM Vol. 1484, p. 28.
29 Article 1(1) of the Paris Convention provides that ‘‘the countries to which this
Convention applies constitute a Union for the protection of industrial property.’’
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law, but also to the practice of the courts and to the practice of the administrative
offices.
Under the principle of national treatment, each country retained its sovereignty in
determining its own level of IPRs protection. The Paris Convention respects the
regulation diversity of different countries of the Union, except in few provisions
including substantive protection. No international harmonization is made out on
the availability, scope and duration of the patent rights. Therefore the task of
international IPRs harmonization does not raise serious problem in the Paris
Convention. As to the domestic legislations which existed before the entry into
force of the Convention, countries have little obligation to modify them in the
substantive aspects. As to the legislations after the Convention, the domestic
balance of the public and private interest is still the focus of the legislators, and
little international obligation imposed by the Convention has been taken into
consideration.
2.2.2 Limitation on Rights
The Paris Convention also embodies few substantive standards of protection,
which include: the right of priority (Article 4), independence of patent (Article
4bis), the right of the inventor to be mentioned (Article 4ter), failure to work and
compulsory license (Article 5quater and 5A), patents in international traffic
(Article 5ter), Grace Period for the payment of maintenance fees (Article 5bis)
and inventions shown at international exhibitions (Article 11). In these substantive
protection areas, the main method the Convention adopted to resolve the
controversy of IPRs protection in the process of harmonization is to limit the rights
of IPRs holder.
Articles 5quater and 5A provide the compulsory license as a remedy of the
abuse of patent right, the main purpose of which is to ensure that the exercise of
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patent right is not inconsistent with the justification of its protection. Compulsory
licensing is defined generally as the granting of a license by a government to use a
patent without the patent holder’s voluntary permission. Article 5A(2) provides
grounds for the granting of compulsory licence, that is, ‘‘each country of the
Union shall have the right to take legislative measures providing for the grant of
compulsory licences to prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise of
the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work’’.
The main argument underlying the provisions requiring the working of an invention
in the country where the patent was issued is the consideration that, in order to
promote the industrialization of that country, patents for invention should not be
used merely to block the working by others of the invention in the country or to
control the importation of the patented product; they should rather be used to
introduce the use of the new technology into the country. A compulsory licence
may not be applied for, on the ground of failure to work or for insufficient
working before the expiration of a period of four years from the date of filing of
the patent application or three years from the date of the grant of the patent,
whichever period expires last; and the compulsory license shall be refused if the
patent holder justifies his inaction by legitimate reasons. Such a compulsory
licence shall be non-exclusive and shall not be transferable, even in the form of the
grant of a sub-licence.30
However, there is no provision as to what constitutes a ‘‘legitimate reason’’ of the
inaction of a patent holder. Whether a patent holder can really be expected to
work his patent is first of all an economic consideration and then also a question
of time. Working in all countries of the world is generally not economically
reasonable. Therefore, it is recognized that immediate working in all countries is
impossible and that several factors require to be considered with regard to
working. For example, a pharmaceutical company may not market a drug in a
specific country because the cost-benefit analysis would not yield a favourable
                                                
30 The Paris Convention, Article 5A(4).
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result and would harm the company. In addition, it is unclear whether failure to
work includes instances where the pharmaceutical company does market a drug
in a developing country, but keeps the prices high and unaffordable to a majority
of the population. So the concept of  ‘‘failure to work’’ remains unclear and the
‘‘legitimate reasons’’ are subject to the further illustration of domestic law.
What’s more, the language of Article 5A(2) goes as this: ‘‘for example, failure to
work.’’ Therefore, failure to work is not the only ground of abuse of rights and
grant of compulsory license.
Article 5A(3) also provides that ‘‘forfeiture of the patent shall not be provided for
except in cases where the grant of compulsory licences would not have been
sufficient to prevent the said abuses. No proceedings for the forfeiture or
revocation of a patent may be instituted before the expiration of two years from
the grant of the first compulsory licence’’. What can be derived form this
provision is that if the compulsory licence does not provide sufficient remedy to
the abuse of right, another form of remedy could be forfeiture. The difference
between compulsory license and forfeiture is: after the grant of compulsory license
the patent holder still maintain the title of ownership of the patent, and is entitled to
get adequate compensation; but after the forfeiture, the former right holder lose
the title of the ownership of the patent and no claim to compensation will be
satisfied. Therefore, forfeiture is both a form of remedy and a sanction to the
abuse of right.
2.3 Harmonization of the TRIPS Agreement
2.3.1 Incorporation of IPRs into the WTO Agreements
IPRs became a trade issue and were incorporated into the WTO Agreements for
a number of reasons. Ideas and knowledge have been an important part of trade.
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Most of the value of new medicines and other high technology products lies in the
amount of invention, innovation, research, design and testing involved. Even
products that used to be traded as low-technology goods or commodities now
contain a higher proportion of invention and design in their value — for example
brand name clothing or new plant varieties. At the same time, the growing
capacity of manufactures in developing countries to penetrate distant markets for
traditional industrial products has forced the developed countries to rely more
heavily on their comparative advantages in the production of IP goods than in the
past. As a result, international trade in goods embodying IP has increased
substantially in recent decades.
Against this background, a number of industrialized countries, concerned with the
erosion of the competitiveness of their industries, increasingly felt that inadequate
protection of IPRs in technology-importing countries reduced their competitive
advantage in the IP goods. They called for stronger IPRs protection. However,
the existing conventions cannot fully satisfy the requirements of the exporters of IP
goods because of certain alleged shortcomings.
First, the membership is not universal. For example, while 162 countries signed
the Paris Convention, only 88 signed the Berne Convention, and only 32
countries signed the Rome Convention. The U.S. had not sign the Berne
Convention until 1988. The result is that there exists differing level of protection of
IPRs around the world.
Second, the obligations or the standards of protection required by most of these
conventions are considered by some to be insufficient. Most of them only impose
a national treatment obligation and generally do not specify minimum levels of
protection that signatories must provide to a particular IPR. For example, the
Paris Convention does not specify what types of products must be eligible for
patent protection. There exists neither the condition of patentability, nor the non-
discrimination provision with regard to the field of technology. Also, it does not
stipulate the minimum duration of patents, nor does it define the scope of the
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exclusive rights. Although focusing on the industrial property, the Paris
Convention does not seek an agreement on trade secrets (undisclosed
information). Protection of computer software and sound recording was needed
in the view of the industrialized countries, but their protection under the copyright
regime is also not enough.
Third, many of the conventions are viewed as being void of adequate provisions
relating to dispute settlement and enforcement. Usually, they do not oblige
signatories to enforce the relevant IPRs laws within their respective jurisdictions.
They also do not provide for adequate international dispute settlement when
signatories fail to meet the minimum standards which they have agreed to uphold.
Although in theory, most of these conventions would allow a signatory state to
bring a complaint before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), this has never
occurred in practice. The lack of effective dispute settlement mechanism is then
matched by a corresponding lack of sanction for violations. Consequently,
disputes were frequently addressed through bilateral channels, with trade
sanctions of the developed countries. The U.S. played a particularly prominent
role in using unilateral sanctions or threats of sanctions to deal with IPRs
infringements. The two main instruments used were Section 337 of the U.S.
Tariff Act of 1930, and Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended by
the Omibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.31
Although there existed these alleged problems, it is difficult to negotiate new
substantive amendments of those conventions within the divergent views between
the North and South. When a group of developed countries proposed an
amendment to the Paris Convention so as to establish certain minimum standards
of protection and increase its enforcement obligations relating to patents, a group
of developing countries responded by proposing instead a weakening of the
Convention’s obligations in some areas. While preparatory meetings and
negotiations continued on these proposed amendments for over years, in the end
                                                
31 Hoekman and Kostecki, see above note 24, p. 146-147.
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neither view prevailed and consequently the Convention remained unaltered and
its basic problem remained unresolved. With little fruit for their efforts towards the
expansion of the IPRs protection standards and enforcement through international
IPRs conventions, the U.S. and other main industrialized countries resort to the
WTO as a new forum for IPRs issues.
It should be noted that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-1947
(GATT-1947) already contained some provisions which indirectly addressed
certain IPRs issues. For example, Article III4 of the GATT-1947 required
contracting parties to extend national treatment for imported goods. Article
XX(d) allowed contracting parties to take measures necessary to secure
compliance with laws relating to the protection of patents, trademarks and
copyright. There are also some previous attempts within the GATT to address
more IPRs issues. Until the Uruguay Round, these efforts had generally gotten no
better success than the efforts within the WIPO. For example, the issue of
counterfeit goods was subject to some discussions during the Tokyo Round, but
no agreement could be reached prior to the completion of the round. After the
Tokyo Round had been completed, the U.S., with the support of the EC, Japan
and Canada, persisted with the counterfeit goods issue and during the 1982
GATT Ministerial Conference attempted to have the GATT’s developing work
plan expanded to include issues relating to counterfeit goods. In spite of the strong
opposition voiced by some developing countries, the 1982 Ministerial Declaration
did provide for some work to be done on IPRs aspect, but in the area of
counterfeit goods only.32
                                                                                                                           
32 See Ministerial Declaration of Thirty-Eighth Session, adopted on 29 November 1982,
GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents (BISD) 29S/, p. 19. This was soon
followed by a U.S. proposal that the next round of trade negotiations should not be limited
to issues solely related to counterfeit goods but should also be expanded to include
discussion of all trade-related IPRs.
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Although the trade argument was perhaps as old as the international regime on
IPRs itself,33 the arguments made by the proponents of new rules and disciplines
on trade-related aspects of IPRs in the 1980s was very striking.34 The main
reason for the lack of success of these proposals was that treating IPRs as a trade
issue was novel in many respects, since standard setting in the area of IPRs was
traditionally done within the framework of the WIPO. Due to the different
development period and IPRs policy, the developed countries’ motive confronted
the resistant of the developing countries initially. They hold a sceptical attitude
toward the motivation of the developed countries, particularly when the firms in
the developed countries claimed that monopoly rights in the new foreign markets,
such as in LDC, are necessary to recover their R&D costs. On the contrary,
developing countries feared that large MNC would secure global monopolies,
and thereby would charge exorbitant prices for their goods. Lacking the scientific
and financial infrastructures necessary to create patent-induced innovations,
developing countries are far more interested in technology transfer than in the
encouragement of domestic innovations. Not surprising, the motive of the
developed countries was confronted by the resistant of the developing countries.
With regard to patents, for example, developing countries have always
emphasised on local working requirements. They allow parallel imports and
greater scope for compulsory licensing in the absence of local working, for the
purpose of strengthening economic development and social welfare function of the
exclusive rights granted to patents. Therefore, developing countries have little or
no interest in creating a system that impedes their own ability to appropriate new
technologies and products developed by foreign innovators.
                                                
33 Indeed, promotion of international trade figured prominently in the letter of invitation on
the First International Congress for the Consideration of Patent Protection held in Vienna in
1872.
34 This was reflected in the Basic Framework of GATT Provisions on Intellectual Property:
Statement of Views of the European, Japanese and United States Business Communities,
and in the statement of Yeutter Clayton before the US Congress: An Agenda for the New
GATT Round. See Carrea and Yusuf, see above note 22, p.81-92.
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A consensus had not been achieved until the time of September 1986, when a
ministerial meeting called to finalize the agenda and initiate the new round of
negotiation. Strongly supported by the developed countries led by the U.S., the
Ministers were finally able to reach agreement on a negotiating mandate for
‘‘trade-related intellectual property issues’’.35 By the time of the Brussels
Ministerial Meeting in the November 1990, a proposal led by India, Brazil,
Egypt, Argentina, and Yugoslavia sought to draw a firm distinction between the
work on trade of counterfeit goods and that on the IPRs more broadly defined.
They were willing to co-operate on the former but opposed the latter. The first
order of priority of poor countries was to ensure that unilateral measures to
protect IPRs did not cause barriers to legitimate trade. There was a general
concern that greater protection of IPRs would strengthen the monopoly power of
MNC, and detrimentally affect poor populations by raising the price of medicines
and food. As IPRs create market power, developing countries sought assurances
that action could be taken against the abuse of monopoly rights by IPRs holders.
However, another proposal which supported an integral part for including both
issues, was advocated by the developed countries.
The result of the enthusiastic promotion of developed countries and the
compromise of developing and least developed countries is the adoption of the
former’s proposal with some modification by the latter’s proposal, with a final act
called the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Right. As one of the most significant achievements of the Uruguay Round
negotiation, the TRIPS Agreement was signed by 124 members together with
other multilateral trade agreements and the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization (the WTO Agreement). It is the first
comprehensive IPRs agreement ever executed by most trading nations of the
                                                
35 Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, GATT, adopted on 20 September 1986,
BISD 33S/19 (1986), p. 25-26.
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world which establishes minimum standards for practically all categories of
IPRs.36
2.3.2 The Solution of the TRIPS Agreement
The TRIPS Agreement marks a departure from previous IPRs conventions in that
it not only inherits the principle of national treatment, but also provides the ‘‘most-
favoured-nation’’ treatment (MFN). That is, the obligation to extend, with some
limited exceptions, the advantages granted to one member to all the other
members. These principles are meant to end discrimination, both between
foreigners and nationals and between nationals of different countries, which arises
when IPRs are granted only to the nationals of the country that pressed for them,
as for example in the case of the recognition of pharmaceutical patents in South
Korea.
What’s more, the Agreement also goes much farther to require the harmonization
of substantive standards of IPRs among members. At the same time, members
agreed to offer fair and equitable enforcement of those substantive rights by
providing effective action against any act of infringement, including expeditious
remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent to
further infringements. These fundamental differences in the approach of
harmonization are notable examples of the deepening of international IPRs law.
To an ever-increasing degree, the domestic IPRs laws of most members are being
directly affected by international trade negotiations.
As analysed in Section 2.1, the harmonization of different IPRs protection at the
international level faces the task to balance different levels of IPRs protection,
including the controversial rationale of IPRs protection and different national
interest. The harmonization of pre-TRIPS IPRs conventions is not so ambiguous,
                                                
36 Correa and Yusuf, see above note 22, p. 93.
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so the limitation on rights by compulsory license and forfeiture more or less meets
the requirement of balance. However, the harmonization of the TRIPS Agreement
expands to the substantive areas such as availability, scope and duration of the
protection. Merely limitation on rights is not sufficient and further solutions are
necessary to balance the different interest as a counterpart of the improved IPRs
protection.
The solution of the TRIPS Agreement in this aspect is unique as it is not only built
in the text of the Agreement itself, but also built outside the Agreement and in the
context of the Uruguay Round package of WTO. That means, during the
negotiation, the cross-field exchange of interest happened and benefit gained in
other fields partly traded-off the loss in IPRs field. Another unique characteristic
of the solution of the TRIPS Agreement is that it leaves some hot disputed topics
unresolved in the text of the Agreement, and allows certain limited flexibility in the
interpretation and application of the different members. The following part this
sector devotes to overview how did the TRIPS Agreement balance the different
interest in the process of international harmonization. Further analysis of the
flexibility of the Agreement is the main task of next chapter, but the other solutions
serve as a background and context of the analysis.
2.3.2.1 Incorporation of the Paris Convention
Article 2 of the TRIPS Agreement entitled ‘‘Intellectual Property Conventions’’
establishes the basic link between the TRIPS Agreement and the other IPRs
conventions. It provides:
1. In respect of Parts II and IV of this Agreement, Members shall comply
with Articles 1-12 and 19 of the Paris Convention (1967).
2.   Nothing in Parts I to this Agreement shall derogate from existing
obligations that Members may have to each other under the Paris
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Convention, the Berne Convention, the Rome Convention and the Treaty
on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits.
This provision incorporates into the TRIPS Agreement some provisions of the
Paris Convention, as amended in 1967. Through this incorporation, the above-
mentioned provisions of the Paris Convention are made applicable to those states
that have ratified the TRIPS Agreement even they had never become parties to
the Paris Convention. Therefore, the TRIPS Agreement not only incorporates the
non-discrimination and few substantive provisions, but also embraces the
limitation on rights conferred by the Paris Convention, for instance, compulsory
license for failure to work or other reasons, and forfeiture measures.37
2.3.2.2 Trade-off
During the negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement, the initial resistance of the
developing countries was clear and strong. However, unlike the WIPO
negotiations where countries had to consider only the direct arguments for or
against higher standards of protection, the WTO negotiations would allure
developing countries to look into what they would gain in other fields by offering
concession on IPRs. Although the IPRs-incorporation approach was initially
resisted by the developing countries,38 the convergence of various factors and
political pressures led them to acquiesce in the establishment of higher IPRs
standards in the framework of the WTO.
The trade-off were made between the TRIPS and the rest of the agenda of the
Uruguay Round negotiation. These areas include, e.g. agricultural products,
textiles, and tropical products, where the developed countries offered more
market access to developing and least developed countries. Trade-off also
occurred in other areas, although it is not possible to identify specific linkages of
                                                
37 See above, p. 14.
38 Even after the adoption of the Ministerial Declaration on Uruguay Round in 1986, which
placed the topic on the agenda of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the resistant of the
developing country members still existed.
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the agenda formally. For instance, the U.S. government started to make effective
IPRs protection a precondition for access to the U.S. market under the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) for developing countries. Reversals on
the MFN treatment may give rise to non-developing countries in the 1980s in
their attitudes towards inward protection of the IPRs. Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) also played a role in inducing the acceptance of the Agreement, because to
attract FDI in certain high-tech sectors requires strong protection and
enforcement of IPRs. As a counterpart, interest groups in developing countries
also existed that favoured stronger protection of IPRs, e.g. those domestic IP-
creating or IP-using industries where the transfer of technology generally requires
FDI, which is generally conditional on the existence of strong protection of the
IPRs. Therefore, the membership in the WTO may increase the credibility of
domestic economic reforms in developing countries by reducing the uncertainty of
trade regimes, providing a more open trading environment, and additional
incentives to FDI.
At the same time, with the inclusion of trade-related IPRs issues in the framework
of the WTO, trade sanctions in this area can only be taken so far as the retaliation
has been authorized by the WTO. The multilateral framework of the WTO comes
to be perceived by the developing countries as less evil than bilateral concessions,
which means the increased trade security for trade relations under the WTO
agreement.39 The security is safeguarded by the dispute settlement procedure of
the WTO.40
In summary, the acceptance of the TRIPS deal in the Uruguay Round by the
developing countries stemmed from a mix of fear, motivation and compromise.
They feared that without the multilateral mechanism, they would be increasingly
                                                
39 For unilateral sanctions, see above note 21. Actually, by the threat of trade retaliation for
inadequate IPRs protection, the U.S., and later the EC, were able to induce significant
changes in the IPRs laws of many developing countries.
40 Primo Braga, see above note 14, p. 255.
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vulnerable to unilateral sanction by the U.S. and the EC.41 At the same time, a
growing perception existed that IPRs laws also had benefits in terms of allowing
participation in creative activities, providing consumer with access to new
products, and giving industries better opportunities of obtaining cutting–edge
technologies.42 They increasingly felt that stricter IPRs protection might also in
their interest, if only because it was a necessary component of a more general
move towards a market economy.43 Potential cross-field trade-off further
enlarged the scope for negotiation and compromise. As exchange for the
acceptance of the Agreement, poor nations and transition economies could seek
more open market for their agricultural and tropical products, as well as better
market access for their textile exports.
Developing countries realised that IPRs impose social costs on them. Although
the costs is, to varying degrees, offset by the prospects of enhanced market
access and the relief from unilateral trade sanctions, inter alia, to adopt a stricter
IPRs protection also takes time, especially in the areas where no protection was
established at all. Therefore, developing countries insisted on a long transitional
period during which changes in domestic legislation could be implemented, as well
                                                
41 The threat of unilateral sanction was used to push developing countries to support the
TRIPS negotiation at the Uruguay Round. The countries placed on the Priority Watch List
of the U.S in 1989 in this effort included India, Brazil, Taiwan and Thailand, which all
opposed the inclusion of IPRs protection in the Uruguay Round in general and in TRIPS in
particular. The action against Brazil and India, two of the biggest members of the developing
country coalition, the group of seventy-seven countries, played a major role in splitting the
coalition and in securing acquiescence to TRIPS by developing countries. The IP Coalition
(the main lobby power in the U.S. in favour of the TRIPS Agreement) also suggested that
the U.S. should condition debt forgiveness to Latin American countries on adequate patent
protection.
42 It is important in this connection that developing countries were not really a cohesive bloc
on the TRIPS issue. Some of the poorer countries had tightened their domestic protection of
IPRs unilaterally so as to attract FDI and technology transfer or as a response to the threat
of the U.S. action, feared to be undercut by competitors in other developing countries. This
can be seen from the fact that over 40 developing countries unilaterally strengthened their
IPRs regimes in the 1990s. See Mansfield, Edwin, ‘‘Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign
Direct Investment, and Technology Transfer’’, discussion paper No. 19, Washington, D.C.:
The World Bank and International Finance Corporation (1994). Available at <
http://www.ifc.org/economics/pubs/dp19/dp19.pdf>.
43 Hoekman and Kostecki, see above note 24, p.152-153.
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as the technological cooperation to implement the high IPRs standards. The
inclusion of transitional arrangement and technological cooperation provision
allure the final accept of the Agreement by the developing and least developed
countries.
2.3.2.3 Limitations
Another solution of the TRIPS Agreement to harmonize different rationales and
interests of members was to set limitation on the protection of IPRs in addition to
the already existing limitations inherited from the Paris Convention. This is mainly
promoted by the developing countries who are more sceptical and reluctant to the
strong protection of IPRs. During the negotiation of the Agreement, a ‘‘Group of
14’’ developing countries submitted a proposal to highlight the importance of the
public policy objective underlying the national IPRs systems,44 the necessity of
recognizing those objectives at the international level, and the need to specify
some basic principles which could subsequently elucidate the application of any
standards established in the TRIPS agreement. They insisted on the need to
respect and safeguard national legal systems and traditions on IPRs, in the light of
the diverse needs and levels of development of countries participating in the IPRs
negotiations.
The limitation on the protection of patent in the TRIPS Agreement includes:
limitations on patentability subject, limitation on right conferred to the patent
holder, and the duration of protection. The next chapter will further explain these
limitations in detail.
2.3.2.4 Flexibility
However, even having embodied the limitations on the protection, there is still no
consensus on certain issues such as the precise subject of protection, international
exhaustion of IPRs, the status of biotechnologies, the novelty and non-
                                                
44 Proposal submitted by a group of 14 developing countries during TRIPS negotiations in
the Uruguay Round negotiation, submitted on 14 May 1990, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/71.
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obviousness standards of eligibility for patent protection. These areas also extend
to the exact scope of rights, as well as the exceptions of the exclusive rights, e.g.
it is disputable whether a country must declare a national health emergency to
invoke compulsory licensing.
When such hot issues could not be resolved during the negotiations, the
negotiators adopted a drafting technique to achieve the general agreement on the
convention. That is, they left these issues open-ended and allowed a certain
amount of flexibility in interpretation and application. Flexibility occurs as a way of
permitting agreement without full resolution in hard legal cases, where the
meanings of the key terms are disputed. The Agreement does not provide in
specific content of many labels of IPRs issues and does not offer an objective or
positive definition for many notions of IPRs. Consequently, although there may be
some convergence on basic rights granted, the precision of the protection remains
unclear. Under the Agreement, applicability of the TRIPS-mandated rights can be
interpreted more or less expansively depending on the role ascribed to the
specific list of examples (representative or exhaustive) and the requisite level of
novelty imposed. This outcome is precisely what would be expected in an
agreement driven by parties having enough negotiating leverage to force
agreement but inadequate power to prevail fully. Disagreements are sufficiently
masked to permit signing an accord.
All of these unclear areas give developing and least developed countries certain
room to develop the practice which is consistent with their developing level. The
WTO Director-General Mike Moore stated that ‘‘TRIPS Agreement plays a vital
role in tackling the problems like crisis of disease facing developing countries. It
strikes carefully-negotiated balance between providing IP protection and allowing
countries the flexibility to ensure that treatments reach the world’s poorest and
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most vulnerable people. Countries must feel secure that they can use this flexibility
and the work started in the TRIPS Council should reinforce that security’’.45
                                                
45 Moore, Mike, “Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines”, the statement issued on
the TRIPS Council’s special discussion on 20 June 2001. Available at
< http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news01_e/dg_trips_medicines_010620_e.htm >.
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3 Flexibility of the TRIPS
Agreement
The exploitation of the flexibility of the TRIPS Agreement in this thesis is made in
two dimensions: horizontal and vertical dimensions. Horizontal dimension of the
TRIPS Agreement covers the general issues that constitute the legal framework of
the interpretation of the Agreement, and affect all fields of IPRs. Provisions in this
dimension where the flexibility could be exploited are: the purposes and
objectives of the Agreement reflected in the preamble and Articles 7 and 8;
exhaustion of rights in Article 6; anti-competitive measures in Articles 31 and 40;
suspension of non-violation complaint in Article 64; and transitional period in Part
VI. Meanwhile, the exception to these flexible fields is the national treatment and
MFN in Articles 3 and 4, where there is no flexibility allowed. Vertical dimension
of the TRIPS Agreement with regard to patent protection is included in Section 5
of Part II (Articles 27 – 34). Provisions in this dimension where flexibility exists
are mainly concerned about: patentability; rights conferred to the patent owner;
exceptions of the exclusive rights and conditions on patent applications; use
without the authorization of the right holder; transitional arrangement and the
‘‘mailbox’’ system.
3.1 Flexibility in Horizontal Dimension
3.1.1 Interpretaion Framework: Objectives and Principles
The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes (DSU) of the WTO states that the WTO’s dispute settlement system
serves ‘‘to clarify the existing provisions of the Agreements in accordance with
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the customary rules of interpretation of public international law.’’46 It is now
established in international law that the Vienna Convention on the Law of the
Treaties (VCLT) is the authoritative statement of the customary rules in
international law for the interpretation of treaties.47 As such, it is binding even on
those states which are members of the WTO but have not ratified the VCLT. The
interpretation authority of the VCLT has also been accepted by the WTO panels
and Appellate Body. It was first noted in US — Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline case.48 The Appellate Body subsequently
confirmed that the VCLT is a codification of customary international law, and
therefore binds all States. In the case of Japan — Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages, the Appellate Body ruled that both Article 31 and Article 32 of the
VCLT have attained the status of a rule of customary international law. The rules
of treaty interpretation spelt out in the VCLT have also been applied in disputes
specifically dealing with the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement, e.g. in India-
Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Products (India
Mailbox) case,49 and Korea-Dairy Products case.50 There have been numerous
other rulings from panels or Appellate Body of the WTO which confirmed the
application of the VCLT to the interpretation of the WTO Agreements including
the TRIPS Agreement.
Article 31 of the VCLT states:
                                                
46 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2
of the WTO Agreement, adopted on 15 April 1994, LT/UR/A-2/DS/U/1, Article 3.2.
47 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, adopted on 23 May 1969, UNTS Vol.
1155, p. 331.
48 Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS2/AB/R (29 April 1996), p 17.
49 Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS50/AB/R (19 December 1997), para. 46.
50 Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS114/R (17 March 2000), para. 7.26
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(1) A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and
in the light of its object and purpose.
(2) the context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annex:
         … …
The preamble of the TRIPS Agreement acknowledges that the IPRs are private
rights. At the same time, it recognizes the underlying public policy objectives of
national legal systems for the protection of IPRs, including developmental and
technological objectives. It also recognizes the special needs of the LDC
members in respect of the maximum flexibility in the domestic implementation of
laws and regulations in order to enable them to create a sound and viable
technological base. Of particular significance are Articles 7 and 8 on the
objectives and principles of the Agreement. Article 7 provides that the protection
and enforcement of IPRs should contribute to the promotion of technological
innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and
obligations. Furthermore, Article 8 provides that:
Principles
1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations,
adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-
economic and technological development, provided that such measures are
consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.
2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the
provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of
intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which
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unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of
technology.
The importance of the general provisions and basic principles contained in the
preamble and Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement exists in the horizontal
dimension. That means, they are relevant to all the subsequent provisions in the
specific fields of IPRs because they establishes the interpretation framework that
must guide the decision-making process of the dispute settlement body (DSB)
constituted under the DSU, and eventually the application of the Agreement by
the national courts stressed in Section VI. Therefore, the preamble, Articles 7 and
8 provide a general framework of interpretation and application of the
Agreement, and constitute the legal basis for the members to reserve domestic
control of IPRs policy.
In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international law, each
provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the objectives and
purposes of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its text. What’s more,
the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement should also be viewed together with
the agreements relating to the TRIPS Agreement. Article 31.2 paragraphs a and b
of the VCLT provides that the context of the treaty shall also compromise any
agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in
connection with the conclusion of the treaty, and any instrument which was made
by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and
accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
The WTO’s numerous trade agreements, including the TRIPS Agreement, were
negotiated and concluded as a single package, with all WTO members agreeing
to all the treaties. Therefore, all of the other Agreements negotiated at the
conclusion of the 1986-1994 Uruguay Round of trade negotiations are
agreements ‘‘relating to’’ the TRIPS Agreement that were made ‘‘in connection’’
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with the conclusion of the Agreement. The chief significant agreement in this
context is the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization (the WTO Agreement), the founding treaty to which all the other
multilateral WTO agreements — and in particular the GATT-1994, the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the TRIPS Agreement – are
annexed. The provisions of the WTO Agreement are clearly parts of the
‘‘context’’ within which the terms of the TRIPS Agreement must been
interpreted.
In particular, the preamble of the WTO Agreement provides a further textual
basis for interpreting the TRIPS Agreement in a fashion that is ‘‘consistent with
States’ obligations under international law’’. In the preamble, WTO members do
not state that trade is an end itself, but rather assert that it serves as a means to an
end. Specifically, WTO members recognize ‘‘that their relations in the field and
economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of
living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real
income, … while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to
protect and preserve the environment and enhance the means for doing so in a
manner consistent with their respective needs and the concerns at different level of
economic development’’; and recognized ‘‘further that there is a need for positive
efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least
developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade
commensurate with the needs of their economic development’’.
Other related instruments include the WTO’s Ministerial Decision on Measures
in Favour of Least Developed Countries, adopted as part of the final act of the
Uruguay Round and its numerous annexed agreements. In that decision, the
Ministers recognized the plight of the LDC and the need to ensure their effective
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participation in the world trade system, and to make further measures to improve
their trading opportunities. Therefore, they decided that:51
… if not already provided for in the instruments negotiated in the course of
the Uruguay Ground, notwithstanding their acceptance of these instruments,
the least-developed countries, and for so long as they remain in that
category, while complying with the general rules set out in the aforesaid
instruments, will only be required to undertake commitments and
concessions to the extent consistent with their individual development,
financial and trade needs, or their administrative and institutional capacities.
Furthermore, the WTO Ministers agreed that the rules set out in the various
agreement and instruments and the traditional provisions of the Uruguay Round
should be applied in a flexible and supportive manner for the LDC. To this effect,
sympathetic consideration shall be given to specific and motivated concerns raised
by the LDC in the appropriate Councils and Committees.52
Another related agreement, the GATT, has accepted social interest through
restrictive interpretations of the exceptions listed in Article XX, which allows the
balancing of social objectives, such as public health and protection of the
environment on one hand and free trade on the other hand. Since the US –
Shrimp Turtle Case the exception has been recognized. A central issue in this
case was whether exhaustible resources in Article XX(g) include endangered
species. In answering this question, the WTO Appellate Body examined the
question of whether an endangered species is an exhaustible resource under
Article XX(g) by referring to international environmental law. The Appellate Body
ruling, in effect, allowed members to take action to protect exhaustible natural
                                                
51 Decision on Measures in Favour of Least-Developed Countries, Annex 4 of the WTO
Agreement, adopted on 15 April 1994, LT/UR/A-2/DS/U/1, para 1.
52 Ibid, para 2(iii).
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resource in a manner that respects the context of public international law.
Therefore, the agreements under the WTO are not isolated from the regime of
public international law, such as human rights and environmental protection, which
are for the purpose of social interest and public good.
Furthermore, Article 31(3) of the VCIL also provides that the context of a treaty
should also be taken into account, which includes:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation
of the treaty or the application of its provisions.
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.
(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties.
At the first WTO Ministerial Conference in 1996, the member countries adopted
the Singapore Ministerial Declaration. It stated that in pursuit of the goal of
sustainable growth and development for the common good, the members were
renewing the commitment to a system that was ‘‘fair, equitable and more open.’’
The members also recalled that the WTO Agreement contains provisions
conferring differential and more favourable treatment for developing countries,
including special attention to the particular needs of the LDC.53
As a summary, the purposes and objectives of the TRIPS Agreement are
embodied in the text of the Agreement, especially in the preamble, Articles 7 and
8, the context of the Agreement including the related and subsequent instruments
and practice. They constitute the framework of the interpretation and then the
application of the TRIPS Agreement. All these text and context analysed above
                                                
53 Singapore Ministerial Declaration, adopted on 13 December 1996,
WT/MIN(96)/DEC/W/, para. 6, 13.
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disclose the concern of the members on the balance of private rights and public
interest, and the various economic developing levels of members. They constitute
the legal basis for the further exploration of the flexibility of the Agreement for the
purpose of public good or the interest of developing and least developed country
members.
3.1.2 Exhaustion
IPRs protection is primarily national legislation, with each country creating and
enforcing its own IPRs exclusive within its jurisdiction. The IPRs holders must
therefore seek protection and enforcement in the territory of each country
individually. As a result, the IPRs holder may hold a set of parallel national IPRs
covering the same IP in a variety of jurisdictions. According to the principle of
exhaustion of IPRs, once the IPRs holder has firstly sold the product covered by
the IPRs, he cannot thereafter have any control on the later stages of the
marketing of the product. The IPRs are deemed to have been exhausted after the
first sale.
There are different legal systems under the issue of IPRs exhaustion. Some states
follow a rule of national exhaustion, which is limited in the territory of a state.
National exhaustion has no effect on parallel IPRs under the jurisdiction of other
states, each of which continues to be fully enforceable in its own jurisdiction. As a
result, the holder can separately invoke each parallel IPR in different jurisdictions
against the import, use or release of even authorized products first sold in another
jurisdiction.
The other states adopt an international IPRs exhaustion policy, which treats a first
sale in any jurisdiction as automatically exhausting the holder’s parallel IPRs in all
other jurisdictions. Under this approach, a product may move freely anywhere in
the worldwide market following any first sale. For example, when a patent holder
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in a country sells the patented product, the buyer is free to use it in any way he
likes, including selling it and exporting it to another country. Presuming that a
product patented in country A is sold to buyer in country B. A person in another
country C imports it for sale in country C where this product is also patented.
Since the patent right has been exhausted in country A after the first sale, the
patent holder cannot stop the export of the product to country C, which can be
considered legal even without the authorization of the patent holder. This process
has been called ‘‘parallel import’’ to distinguish it from the normal import of the
product with the authorization of the patent holder. If the patent holder in country
A normally sells the patented goods at a higher price in country C, the parallel
import form country B may push the prices down, whereby the consumers will
benefit.
A third option is regional exhaustion, by which rights are completed within a
group of countries in a certain region, thereby allowing parallel trade among them,
but are not exhausted between regional countries and non-regional countries. A
typical example of this case is the EU, which adopts exhaustion policy in all fields
of IPRs within the region but bars parallel imports coming from the countries
outside its territory.
The policy choice of the international exhaustion problem is decided by the
balance between the interest of consumer and right holder. Proponents of
international exhaustion argue that permitting parallel imports protects the local
consumers against artificially high prices through increased domestic competition,
the very efficiencies envisioned by the free-trade principles on which the WTO is
predicated. The rule would also encourage exports of low-cost local production,
therefore fostering efficient international resource allocation. Opponents of
international exhaustion argue that global market segmentation can have positive
economic effects. It maximizes IPRs incentive to inventors and investors by
allowing them to generate maximum return from each national market according
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to the parallel protection. Specially, a non-international-exhaustion eliminates the
risky resources of cheaper parallel imports back into national or premium market.
Additionally, consumer non-price interest, such as adequate quality control and
availability of local service and support, is protected by the elimination of the
third-party parallel imports.54
Exhaustion policies vary widely in national legislations. Logically, developing
countries, which are mostly IP-importing countries, prefer to adopt international
exhaustion policy to protect their domestic consumers. However, the U.S. patents
and copyrights holders are protected against parallel imports. Preference of non-
international exhaustion by the U.S. is to maximize the return of domestic IPRs
holders since it is an IP-exporting state. Some other IP-exporting countries like
Japan, permits parallel imports in patented and trademarked goods unless they
are explicitly barred by contract provisions. So it is more open to parallel imports
than the U.S..  New Zealand and Australia have recently removed restrictions
against parallel imports of copyrighted music and videos. Germany, Finland and
Norway also adopted an international exhaustion policy. In these countries,
national markets generally have higher prices for IP goods, domestic consumer
will benefit from the price-competition provided by parallel imports from lower
cost ‘‘foreign’’ jurisdictions. Therefore, the flow of wealth to the IPRs holder is
offset by the consumer loss from the lack of parallel import competition in the
domestic market. The above analysis demonstrates that the exhaustion policy
depends on the calculation of the surplus of the right holder and loss of consumer.
The net wealth left after the offset by conflicting interest plays a dominant role in
the policy making.
                                                
54 Maskus, Keith E., and Lahouel, Boulder M., ‘‘Competition Policy and Intellectual Property
Rights in Developing Countries: Interests in Unilateral Initiatives and a WTO Agreement’’
(Revision, 1999). Available at
< http://www.worldbank.org/research/abcde/washington_12/pdf_files/maskus.pdf>.
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Other than the divergence on economic interest, the lack of agreement on
international exhaustion issue also arises from the controversy on moral
justifications of IPRs.55 An IP creator’s activity can be seen as bestowing
Locke’s labour-based natural rights or as an exercise of Hegel’s personal liberty.
It could also be viewed as an interaction with, and confirmation of, a jointly
owned cultural heritage, the enhancement of national pride and community, the
exercise of a usufruct rights in a trust granted by ancestors for the benefit of the
present and future beneficiaries, or a contribution by the individual to the common
heritage of mankind. The wide diversity of Eastern common heritage and
collectivism versus Western individual incentive viewpoints partly illustrates the
international exhaustion versus non-international exhaustion rule.
Even among the Western world, the different importance attached on moral rights
also affects the exhaustion policy. Moral rights are predicated on natural or
Hegel’s rights of the authors as creator of the work. These systems, associated
most strongly with France, provide extensive post-sale involvement of the authors
in decisions concerning distribution and use of the work. As a consequence,
exhaustion analysis under the moral rights approach differs dramatically from the
economic utility ‘‘inventive to invent’’ justification. The latter, viewing the author’s
creation as an economic product, can readily accommodate first sale exhaustion
based on a demonstration that additional incentive is not required. The former,
which grants the author a right to protect the self-expression and personal identity
manifested in the creation, provides little justification for curtailing or eliminating
this control even after the first sale.
Therefore, despite the efforts of the U.S. negotiators in the Uruguay Round to
incorporate a global standard of national exhaustion into TRIPS, it was impossible
to reach such an agreement. The different policies of members and different
                                                
55 Although the protection of IPRs by the TRIPS Agreement is limited on economic rights,
the moral justification of exhaustion underlies the debate of different systems, and helps to
understand why the exhaustion issue is excluded from the Agreement.
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underlying justifications of these policies are strong enough to leave the
international exhaustion expressly unresolved in the TRIPS Agreement. Article 6
of the Agreement reflects the ultimate inability to agree. It provides that:
For purpose of dispute settlement under this agreement … nothing in this
Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual
property rights.
As a result, the effect of the provision is to leave each member the freedom to
establish its own exhaustion policy without challenge, subject to the national
treatment and MFN provisions of Articles 3 and 4.56 In this area, the only thing
clear is that only after the legally first sale the IPRs could be exhausted.
Counterfeiting and infringement goods could never exhaust the IPRs. Although
Article 6 appears to have been accorded only a passing reference in the
Agreement, it has an important implication for the limitation on the exclusive rights
of the IPRs holder. It is a strong tool to protect the interest of consumer and IP-
importing countries, and to ensure the availability of industrial and agricultural
inputs as well as essential drugs at competitive prices, which is for the stake of
public interest.
3.1.3 Control of Anti-Competitive Practices
IPRs, by conferring exclusive rights to individuals, empower the right holder to
appropriate the full market value of the protected subject matter. In this context
IPRs, especially patent, could serve both as an incentive for the creation, use and
exploitation of those intangible goods and as a stimulus to competition in a well
functioning free market economy. Yet the exploitation of exclusive rights beyond
the appropriate reward of creative activity could give rise to anti-competitive
behaviour. Through the exploitation of the exclusive rights, right holders may
                                                                                                                           
56 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, adopted on 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2.
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block the transfer of technology or distort the trade by different ways, especially
by license. Therefore, the objective of public policy in this area has thus been to
set the general principles that should guide the control of undesirable behaviour
and seek to mediate the conflict between competition and IPRs.
The balance always begins by asking whether the restrictive practice under IPRs
law results in excessive profits to IPRs holder or merely permits the holder to
realize the reward appropriate to the creative work and investment. Two extreme
doctrines confront each other. One is that the antitrust laws resign supreme.
Under this doctrine an exploitation of IPRs is deemed illegal if it violates any
aspect of anti-trust law; no privilege is accorded to IPRs. The other doctrine is
IPRs statute reign supreme. Under this doctrine the anti-trust laws cannot render
the right holder’s exploitation illegal; the right holder has an absolute privilege to
violate the anti-trust law.
Consequently, there exists interface between IPRs and competition law. The
former solve the fundamental appropriatability problem arising from investment in
information and designate boundaries within which competitors holding IPRs may
exercise their exclusive rights. The latter aims at curbing excessive exploitation of
IPRs beyond the boundaries provided by the IPRs. Structured properly, the two
regulatory systems complement each other in striking an appropriate balance
between needs for innovation, technology transfer, and information dissemination.
Various country situations have lead to various legislations on the relationship
between IPRs law and competition law. In the U.S., the basic approach is both of
them share the common purpose of promoting innovation and enhancing common
welfare. So there is no presumption that IPRs create market power in the anti-
trust context. Instead, it is acknowledged that IPRs could serve as pro-
competitive aim. The general test is to analyse a licensing restraint under the ‘‘rule
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of reason’’ treatment. That is, to inquire whether the restraint is likely to have anti-
competitive effects and, if so, whether the restraint is reasonably necessary to
achieve the pro-competitive benefit which outweighs those anti-competitive
effects.57
In the EU, the relationship between IP licensing and anti-trust law are adjusted by
Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome and related regulations58. Article 85 prohibits all
the agreements that may affect trade or distortion of competition within the
common market. Prohibitive provisions are automatically void unless exempted
by the Commission. Article 85(3) permits that some agreement could be
exempted if it contributes to improve the production or distribution of goods or to
promote technical or economic progress. As to the patent licensing, the
Commission has issued a block exemption, which give exemptions to bilateral,
exclusive manufacturing licences with anti-trust effects which will violate Article
85(1) if not exempted. In 1996, the Commission passed a new regulation No.
240/96 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of
technology transfer agreements, which replace the previous one and harmonize
and simplify rules governing licensing agreements in order to encourage the
dissemination of technical knowledge in the community and to promote the
                                                
57 The ‘‘rule-of-reason’’ test was recommended in the 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the
Licensing of Intellectual Property jointly issued by the U.S. Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission, and respected by domestic judgments unless the restraint is
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Available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.htm>.
58 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (The Treaty of Rome), adopted
on March 25, 1957, UNTS Vol. 298, p. 3.
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manufacture of technically more sophisticated products. The regulation lists a
number of obligations that are commonly found in licensing agreements but not
normally restrict competition.
In most developing countries, the control of patent licensing practices was subject
to special regulations dealing with transfer of technology transactions. Policy has
evolved to a more strict application and enforcement of IPRs guided by the
concern of improving the investment environment and attracting more technology
transfer. In this respect, some countries provide for a certain degree of exemption
for the licensing of patent.
Although there exist different addresses of the relationship between the IPRs and
anti-trust laws in the domestic level, mainly through the anti-trust law, there has
been no international regulation resolving this issue because of the lack of
international anti-trust instrument. Several efforts to harmonize international anti-
trust law, e.g. the Draft International Code of Conduct adopted by the UN
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTD),59 did not see any success in
this field. As a result, the anti-trust behaviour is under the territorial control while
the IPRs protection are internationalised by the adoption of international
conventions. However, with the deepening of globalisation and international trade,
transaction anti-trust behaviours have prospected, especially those anti-trust
behaviours enlarged by the exclusive rights granted as patent. Therefore, there
had been a gap between the prosperity of international IPRs protection and the
lack of international anti-trust regulation. The gap was enlarged by the adoption of
the TRIPS Agreement, which seeks the further international protection of IPRs,
with a unavoidable possibility of the abuse of exclusive rights.
Naturally, during the negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement, there was a general
concern that greater protection of IPRs would strengthen the monopoly power of
                                                
59 Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, adopted on 5 June
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MNC, and detrimentally affect poor populations by raising the price of medicines
and food. As IPRs create market power, developing countries sought assurances
that action could be taken against the abuse of monopoly rights by IPRs holder.
In particular, they feared that suppliers would be placed in a stronger position to
restrictive conditions on the licensing of technology which would distort
international trade.60 Therefore, the inclusion of anti-competitive issue in the final
text of the Agreement was the result of the proposal from developing countries to
prevent the abuse of exclusive IPRs.
One of the general principles established by Article 8(2) of the TRIPS Agreement
is the right of states to adopt appropriate measures ‘‘to prevent the abuse of
intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which
unreasonably restrain the trade or adversely affect the international transfer of
technology’’. As a further particularization, Article 40 is another indication that
IPRs may be exercised abusively. Thus, the Agreement reserves the rights of
nations to adopt and enforce anti-trust laws in order to limit the exercise of IPRs
(especially in licensing) in ways that harm competition or unduly limit the creation
and diffusion of technology.
However, the address of competition by the TRIPS Agreement is not direct.61 It
refers to national law, with regards to both policy determination and
implementation. Thus it allows members to take appropriate measures, provided
that they are consistent with the provisions of the Agreement to prevent the abuse
of IPRs by right holder or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain
trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology.62
The open-end of the TRIPS Agreement in dealing with anti-competitive practices
are evident in the text of the Agreement. The language of Article 40 is essentially
                                                
60 See above note 44.
61 The issue was not dealt with in the same detail as the standards on the availability, scope
and term of IPRs.
62 The TRIPS Agreement, Article 8(2).
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prescriptive and no precise definition of anti-competitive practices is provided. An
important feature of the Agreement is that the evaluation of restraints on
competition depends on the ‘‘relevant market’’ and therefore often has to be
carried out on a case-by–case basis.
However, what constitutes a ‘‘relevant market’’ is not totally clear in the sense of
Article 40. It could mean the market of the product or services produced with the
licensed technology, but it could also mean the market of the technology itself.
According to the 1995 U.S. Guidelines, relevant market refers to technology
market consisted of the IP that is licensed and its close substitutes — that is, the
technologies or goods that are close enough substitutes to significantly constrain
the exercise of market power with respect to the IPRs that is licensed.63 Under
the new EU block exemption regulation, an agreement could become vulnerable if
an exclusive licensee has a particular share of the market. Thus, the issue of what
constitutes a ‘‘relevant market’’ is treated differently in domestic legislation. This
is an area left to further interpretation and are subject to the ‘‘rule-of–reason’’
approaches indicated in the Agreement.
What constitutes ‘‘abuse’’ of IPRs is another unresolved issue. National laws
differ on what they consider abusive practice. In the field of patent, while a few
developed countries limit the concept to anti-competitive practices bordering on
anti-trust violations, most countries consider the doctrine of abuse applicable only
if a right holder fails to work the patent locally in due course or refuse to grant
licences on reasonable terms and thereby hampers industrial development, or
does not supply the national market with sufficient quantities of the patented
product, or demands excessive prices for such products. Again, the agreement
leaves sufficient latitude to national legislation to define what constitutes an abuse
of rights.
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As to the illustrative list as abusive practices, the three examples cited in Article
40(2) were part of the fourteen abusive practices included in the proposal of the
developing country members and were originality reflected in the UNCTAD Draft
Code. Compared with the practices that are usually considered to be critical
under national anti-trust laws, these examples only represent the tip of the iceberg
and do not even exhaust the list of the ‘‘abuses’’ that are normally considered as
per se unlawful in the U.S. courts. On one hand, non-challenge clauses are held
valid or at least redeemable under some national laws. On the other hand,
practices such as vertical restrictions limiting the exhaustion of IPRs, restrictions
on sales or on resale prices, and restrictions on customer are not mentioned
although they are proscribed my most anti-trust laws. Therefore, the examples
given in article 40(2) are not exhaustive. It indicates the intent of the negotiators of
the TRIPS Agreement to leave the specification of unlawful conducts to members.
Therefore, the impact of the TRIPS Agreement will partly depend on the type of
competition rules that members would adopt as to anti-competitive practices.
Within the broad guiding principles of Article 40, there is space for controlling
particular practices constituting abuse of IPRs that have an adverse effect on
competition in the relevant market. Developing countries may be encouraged to
exploit the possibility of minimizing the impact of the TRIPS obligations by
introducing extensive national competition law requirements. Given the lack of
consensus and its attendant soft-law approach, the logical solution is to require
consultations when conflicts occur. In this respect, Article 40(3) cuts two ways. It
allows developing countries in particular cases to request information from
developed countries that bear on alleged violator before its own government. But
it also allows developed countries to demand consultation when they view the
local action or regulations as exceeding the mandate of Article 40.
Meanwhile, the TRIPS Agreement also incorporates Article 10bis of the Paris
Convention by reference. Therefore, it reinforces general principles of unfair
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competition law falling within the purview of the Paris Convention.64 Thus, states
that continue to tolerate practices that blatantly deceive or confuse consumers
with regard to foreign producers could find themselves embroiled in the dispute-
settlement procedures established in the Uruguay Round.
In conclusion, from the economic point of view, IPRs involve both pro-
competitive and anti-competitive elements. The TRIPS Agreement symbolizes the
current thinking in the sense that IPRs are perceived as necessary for the
functioning of a competitive market-based economy and right holder should be
allowed to capture the surplus inherent in creative work as the safest course for
ensuring competition and growth in the long run. However, diverse national
situations and equity considerations may motivate a government to limit the
licensor to capture his profits, as has been the case of countries of net imports of
technology. Thus, these legal limitations on some practices or behaviours might be
considered necessary to ensure a better balance between the licensees and the
licensors incentive to innovate, as well as being beneficial to their economies.
During the economic balance of the interests of innovators and importers of
technology, developed countries focus on that the IPRs licenses could also be an
incentive to the competition and should be free of unreasonable or discriminatory
obligations. Developing countries shall attach a great importance to the provisions
in the TRIPS Agreement dealing with competition, and decrease the competitive
impact of the TRIPS Agreement through restrictive anti-competitive measures.65
3.1.4 Suspension of Non-Violation Complaint
Article 64.2 provides that subparagraphs 1(b) and 1(c) of Article XXIII of the
GATT shall not apply to the settlement of disputes under this Agreement for a
period of five years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement.
Article XXIII of the GATT provides that if any contracting party should consider
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that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being
nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is
being impeded as a result of the application by another contracting party of any
measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or the
existence of any other situation, it might raise a dispute settlement. Therefore
Article 64.2 temporarily suspects the non-violation complaint with regard to IPRs
issues.
According to Article 64.2, the suspension of non-violation complaint shall expire
in 1999. Before the Doha Ministerial Conference, hot discussions were
developed around the extension of suspension. Developing countries argued in
favour of prolonging the suspension and called on the need to adopt a declaration
to clarify this issue. The developed countries opposed this claim. They considered
that a dispute on non-violation complaint could be submitted to the DSB in the
regime of the TRIPS Agreement. In the decision of 14 November 2001 on
implementation-related issues and concerns, the Doha Ministerial Conference
directed the TRIPS Council to:66
continue its examination of the scope and modalities for complaints of the
types provided for under subparagraphs 1(b) and 1(c) of Article XXIII of
GATT 1994 and make recommendations to the Fifth Session of the
Ministerial Conference. It is agreed that, in the meantime, members will not
initiate such complaints under the TRIPS Agreement.
Therefore, the non-violation complaint suspension is still valid nowadays. A legal
implication of the suspension is the inapplicability of the ‘‘legitimate expectation’’
in the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement. In the India Mailbox case, the
Panel stated that ‘‘when interpreting the text of the TRIPS Agreement, the
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legitimate expectations of the WTO Members concerning the TRIPS Agreement
must be taken into account.’’ The Panel found the violation of India based on the
reason that it injured the legitimate expectation of the competitors of the U.S.. In
the appeal of this case, the Appellate Body sustained the finding of the panel but
based on other reasoning. It believed that the Panel’s invocation of and reliance
on the ‘‘legitimate expectations’’ of members as to the conditions of competition
is a hybrid of concerns stemming from the realm of violation and non-violation
complaints, and as such it is an invalid tool for deciding cases involving the
compliance of the TRIPS Agreement.
The Appellate Body stated that Article 64.2 of the TRIPS Agreement stipulates
that only violation complaints under Article XXIII(1)(a) of the GATT will be
allowed during the first five years of the TRIPS implementation, and the complaint
against India falls within this timeframe and is indeed a violation
complaint. Because of the nature of the complaint and the requirement in the
TRIPS Agreement that only violation complaints be heard at this time, only the
concepts that relate to the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement with regard to
the violation of its provisions should be applicable. The Panel’s use of the words
‘‘legitimate expectations’’ is an importation of the concern for ‘‘reasonable
expectations’’ that applies to non-violation complaints, therefore it is not
applicable to the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement. Therefore, the legal
consequence is that, the suspension of non-violation complaints extends to the
suspension of ‘‘legitimate exceptions’’ derived outside the provisions of the
Agreement.
  
3.1.5 Transitional Period
Adoption of a stricter IPRs protection takes time. Moreover, given the complete
absence of certain rights in many countries, enforcement of IPRs entails
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adjustment costs. Developing countries therefore insisted on a long transitional
period during which changes in domestic legislation could be implemented. Some
transitional arrangements to this effect are embodied in the final text of the
Agreement.
The general implementation date of the Agreement for all WTO members was
1996.67 However, developing counties may delay the implementation until the
year 2000, except in Articles 3, 4 and 5.68 This delay is also available to countries
in process of transformation from centrally planned economies into market
economies, which are undertaking structural reform of IPRs law and are
confronted with special problems in the implementation of the corresponding laws
and regulations.69 Any developing country required to extend patent protection to
products which are excluded from such protection by its existing laws (e.g.
pharmaceuticals or agricultural chemicals) may delay that step until the year
2005.70 Members availing themselves of these transitional arrangements are
subject to a standstill requirement, i.e. they may not in the interim lower the
degree of consistency of their laws, regulations and practice with the
Agreement.71 With the exception of Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the agreement, the
LDC members may delay the implementation until the year 2006, and the TRIPS
Council may extend such period.72 In the Doha Ministerial Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, the transitional period of LDC has been
prolonged to 1 January 2016 in the field of patent protection of pharmaceutical
products.73
                                                
67 The TRIPS Agreement, Article 65(1).
68 The TRIPS Agreement, Article 65(2).
69 The TRIPS Agreement, Article 65(3).
70 The TRIPS Agreement, Article 65(4).
71 The TRIPS Agreement, Article 65(5).
72 The TRIPS Agreement, Article 66(1).
73 See above note 56, para. 7.
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These transitional provisions have immediate effect on members, regardless of the
internal constitutional mechanisms they employ to incorporate international law
into domestic law system.74 In contrast to Article 16(5) of the WTO Agreement
and Article 72 of the TRIPS Agreement, which render reservations impracticable,
for the transitional arrangement to become effective, no formal statement or
reservation is required. It follows that the developing countries may avail
themselves of the transitional arrangements and delay the application of TRIPS in
whole or in part with the exception of Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the agreement.
Therefore, subject to the standstill requirement of Article 65(6), developing
countries may enact IPRs laws which are inconsistent with the Agreement in
certain aspects. Consequently, no international responsibility will arise for non-
compliance with the treaty standards during the transitional period.
As to the concept of LDC, the UN’s list tends to be authoritative.75 However, the
status of developing countries is unclear. In fact, this has always been a highly
arbitrary and political concept. No agreement has ever been reached on how to
define developing countries. Indeed, the issue was carefully avoided. For
example, when Portugal and Israel claimed developing country status in the
GATT Balance-of-Payments Committee so as to be able to invoke Article
XVIII(b), the Committee avoided pronouncing on the matter. It is left to countries
to self-declare their status, and the WTO members can decide whether or not to
treat a particular trading partner as a developing country. Assessment is in
practice subject to bilateral interaction, and qualification of the candidates is
sometimes not obvious.
The application of the transitional arrangement was not easy in practice. A case in
point is Argentina, where the Congress intended to delay the obligation to extent
                                                                                                                           
74 See below section 4.1, p. 76.
75 The WTO recognizes as LDC those countries which have been designated as such by the
UN. There are currently 49 LDC on the UN list, 30 of which to date have become WTO
members.
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patent protection for pharmaceutical products until 2003. Under the pressure of
the U.S., this transitional period had to be reduced to five years although
Argentina was entitled to delay patent protection for ten years according to
Article 65(4). The benefits accruing from the transitional arrangements of the
TRIPS Agreement were further mitigated by means of the enactment — again
under U.S. pressure — of the so-called Confidentiality Law.76 Despite the
acknowledgement of the sustained efforts by the Argentine government to
enhance IPRs protection, the U.S. administration considered that there had been
‘‘inadequate improvements’’ in Argentina’s patent regime since April 1996, and
Argentina’s recently enacted legislation on the protection of test data submitted
for marketing approval of pharmaceutical products fell short of international
standards. As a result, the President determined that Argentina fails to provide
adequate and effective means under its laws for foreign nationals to secure, to
exercise, and to enforce exclusive rights in IP. Consequently, the U.S.
government announced its intention to withdraw 50 per cent of Argentina’s
benefit under the GSP programme.
Another difficulty in the exercise of transitional provision is the transitional
arrangements in the field of pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products,
which is further provided in Article 70 paragraphs 8 and 9. The requirement
under this provision is where a member does not make available as of the date of
entry into force of the WTO Agreement patent protection for pharmaceutical and
agricultural chemical products commensurate with its obligations under Article 27,
that member shall establish certain system to file the application of this type and
exercise an exclusive market power. That is the so-called mailbox system.77
Therefore, although the patent protection requirement is in suspension, other
alternative protection requirements are to be met by the developing and least
developed country members.
                                                
76 Law No. 24. 766, Boletin Oficial, Vol. 30 (1996).
77 See below section 3.23, p. 62.
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3.2 Flexibility in Vertical Dimension
3.2.1 Pantentibility
3.2.1.1 Availability of Patent Protction
Article 27.1 provides that patents shall be available for any inventions, whether
products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new,
involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application. The terms
‘‘inventive step’’ and ‘‘capable of industrial application’’ may be deemed by a
member to be synonymous with the terms ‘‘non-obvious’’ and ‘‘useful’’
respectively.78
The various terms mentioned in this provision have not been defined in the text of
the Agreement. In fact, there is considerable flexibility for the members to define
these terms in its domestic legislation so as to reflect its own objectives in this
field. For instance, if a member wishes to give protection to the interest of
established innovators, it may define ‘‘invention’’ in a wider way, so that new
innovations which approximate the earlier ones are not considered to satisfy the
condition of novelty. On the other hand, if it wishes to encourage new innovators,
it may define this term narrowly, thus permitting the patenting of innovations which
approximate the already patented matter. Members can also use the flexibility of
definitions to reflect its national objectives in balancing the interests of innovators
and consumers. The subject of a patent should be an invention, and not mere a
discovery of something which has already existed in nature but was not known
earlier. For example, it is possible for a member to refuse patents for biological or
generic material which has been in existence, though these were not known
                                                
78 The TRIPS Agreement, Footnote 5.
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earlier. It has been suggested that some members could adopt high standards of
patentability so that only revolutionary, as opposed to merely improving,
inventions are granted patents. Another method might be to allow prior art form
to defeat novelty. This could be very useful in cases in which developing country
members contend that a patent claim is based on pre-existing indigenous
knowledge. All of these instances would be justifiable, as there is no consensus on
an international standard of absolute novelty.79
3.2.1.2 Exceptions to Patentibility
Article 27 paragraphs 2 and 3 states that certain types of inventions may be
excluded from patentability at the discretion of a member. The reasons for this
exclusion could be to protect ordre public or morality, to protect human, animal
or plant life or health, or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment. The
following subjects may also be excluded from patentability:
(a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or
animals;
(b) plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological
processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-biological
and microbiological processes.
The presence of these exceptions reinforces the understanding in Part I of the
Agreement that IPRs are qualified and be subject to competing interest that may
be more important than exclusive patent rights. Since there is no definition on the
ordre public or morality, the explanation of these Articles is reserved to the
members and shall be made in accordance with their development situation and
national economy. Whether or not the national interpretation and implementation
                                                
79 Reichman, Jerome H., ‘‘From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the
TRIPS Agreement’’, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol.
29 (1996), p. 30.
62
is inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement shall be examined in the light of the
purposes and objectives of the Agreement.
These exceptions are analogous to Article XX of the GATT, which also contains
general exceptions to the free trade principle. Therefore, disputes on Article XX
of the GATT resolved by the DSB are relevant in this respect. In the US —
Gasoline case, the WTO Appellate Body stated that:80
Article XX of the [GATT] contains provisions designed to permit important
state interests — including the protection of human health, as well as the
conservation of the exhaustible natural resources — to find expression. The
provisions of Article XX were not changed as a result of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations … So far as concerns the WTO,
that autonomy is circumscribed only by the need to respect the requirement
of the [GATT] and the other covered agreements.
It is relevant to note that plants and animals have been excluded from the
obligation of patents, irrespective of their mode of production. For example,
plants and animals, even though produced by modifications through genetic
engineering (transgenic plants or animals) or other methods, need not to be
covered by patents. However, the process for the production of plants and
animals has to be given patents, if there are non-biological or microbiological.
In the field of biotechnology, as a consequence of the Chakrabarty case decided
by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1980,81 there was a wave of claims to patent living
forms of all kinds. Therefore, the possibility in the TRIPS Agreement of excluding
plants and animals from patent protection is important in this context. It can be
used to prevent the private appropriation of natural resources of importance for
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Body, WT/DS2/AB/R (29 April 1996).
81 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 US 303 (1980).
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food and agriculture and for the conservation of the environment. The proposed
review of this provision is after four years from the date of entry into force of the
TRIPS Agreement. The opportunity of review offers developing countries a
possibility to co-operate in defining permanent rules that recognize the right of
national legislation to exclude the patenting of any living form.
Even though plants themselves are excluded, plant varieties have to be covered
by some forms of effective protection, either by patents or by an effective sui
generis system, or by a combination of both. The making of varieties refers to
bringing about improvements by breeding techniques to create stable and uniform
objects with different characteristics. This obligation does not extend to the
protection of animal varieties. There is considerable flexibility for a member to
introduce its own sui generis system.
One example of such a system is the UPOV.82 The object of the UPOV is to
grant certain exclusive rights to plant breeders who develop new varieties of
plants. Normally, farmers provide the source material to the breeders for the
development of new varieties. They are also the users of new varieties developed
by the breeders. So there is a need for a balance between the breeder’s rights
and what has been called the farmers’ privilege. But the UPOV emphasizes on
the breeder’s rights and sacrifices the farmers’ rights, therefore this model is not
preferred to by the developing and least developed country members.
It is not necessary for a member to adopt any model mentioned above, they are
free to evolve their own ‘‘effective’’ sui generis system of protection. The
provisions of the Biodiversity Convention also provide some guidelines in this
respect.83 What’s more, the criteria to be applied in determining whether
                                                
82 The International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV),
adopted on 2 December 1961. Earlier, the applied version was UPOV 1978. Then, a revised
version, UPOV 1991, was negotiated and came into effect. UNTS Vol. 815, p. 89.
83 Convention on Biodiversity, adopted on 5 June 1992, ILM Vol. 31, p. 818.
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protection is ‘‘effective’’ are not defined. Accordingly, countries are free to
determine the scope and contents of the rights to be granted. For instance, they
could grant exclusive rights to breeders with respect to the propagating materials
(that is, seeds and other materials for the reproduction of plants) of new varieties,
subject to clearly stated exceptions for the re-use and eventual sale of seeds by
the farmers and exceptions for the use of protected varieties by a third party in
order to develop a new variety. Sui generis regimes can also include compulsory
licences for reasons of public interest, as well as provide recognition – e.g. via a
royalty or other type of remuneration – of the rights of traditional farmers that
have provided breeding materials.
In working out an ‘‘effective sui generis system’’ for plant varieties, there is
considerable room for co-operation and harmonization of legislation between
developing countries, the majority of which have not yet adopted any kind of
protection for plant varieties. They may wish to propose a sui generis system
which corresponds to their own needs and does not follow the UPOV convention
as revised in 1991, which strengthens breeders’ rights at the expense of farmers’
rights.
3.2.2 Limitation on Rights Conferred
A patent shall confer on its holder the right of making, using, offering for sale,
selling, or importing the patented product or process. The Agreement allows
limited exceptions to the rights of the patent holder. Article 30 provides that
members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a
patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third
parties.
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The exceptions take into account the legitimate interests of the third parties. Not
all interests protected by national legislation are deemed as legitimate under the
TRIPS Agreement. In the light of the language of Article 27 and other provisions
of the Agreement, a systematic interpretation of the Agreement lead to the point
that merely prohibited by national law could not be necessarily legitimate unless
this national law is also consistent with the provisions of the Agreement.
At the same time, as to the judgment of which interest are legitimate, the relevant
source of international law should be taken into consideration. In interpreting the
scope of ‘‘exhaustible national resources’’ as a legitimate interest protected by
Article XX(g) of the GATT, the Appellate Body took a broad view of the
sources of international law that could be appropriately used to articulate the
relevant evolving international legal order, including ‘‘soft law’’ sources, such as
resolutions and authoritative reports and policy statement of relevant international
organizations.84 Hence, according to the widely adopted international customary
law and conventions, human rights including social rights and public health could
also be legitimately interest of the third parties. For instance, a previous GATT
panel had ruled that measures prohibiting the advertising of cigarettes were
defensible under the GATT Article XX as a measure necessary to protect public
health,85 provided that these measures are not discriminatory.
Various qualifying terms used here have not been clarified; there may be an ample
scope for differences of opinion. Clarity will emerge during the course of the
application of the Agreement. Based on prevailing practices, it does appear
reasonable to assume that these limited exceptions cover the use of patented
                                                
84 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the
Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R (12 October 1998), para. 128, 130.
85 Thailand — Restrictions on Importation of and International Taxes on Cigarettes,
Reports of the Panel, DS10/R, BISD 37S/200 (7 November 1990).
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products or processes for scientific or technological experiments in pursuit of
further scientific development. In fact, for members who wish to encourage
domestic innovation, it may be desirable to provide a limited exception that
patented matter may be put to experimental use without the authorization of the
patent holder. It may enable domestic innovators to do experiment with this
matter and bring about further improvements, particularly those suited to local
conditions. A certain degree of reverse engineering (i.e. proceeding backwards
from the patented product to learn how it has been produced) is inevitable in this
process, which may be of help to new innovators working on the further
development of patented matter.
3.2.3 Transitional Arrangments
Because the obligations of Section 5 require some members to extend protection
to products and process that were previous not protectable under their national
laws, a number of transitional issues have to be addressed. Article 65.4 permits
developing country members an additional transition period of compliance with
the relevant obligations of the TRIPS Agreement when such members are
required by the Agreement to extend product patent protection to areas of
technology that have not previously been subjected to protection within their
territories.
Although transitional arrangements give some members a breathing space, this
space cannot be exploited unlimitedly.86 A particular case in point is the India
Mailbox case under the DSB of the WTO. Article 70.8 provides that a member,
who did not have patent protection for pharmaceutical or agricultural products on
1 January 1995, shall establish a provisional system whereby patent applications
for these products can be filed during the transition period. This is the ‘‘mailbox’’
system. Once the transitional period has ended, it must then review all such
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applications and extend patent protection for the remaining of the patent’s term,
calculated from the date of the original filing. Under Article 70.9, where a product
is the subject of an application under Article 70.8, a member is required to grant
exclusive marketing rights for a five-year period after the product receives
marketing approval, or until the patent is granted or rejected, whichever period is
shorter. In order to qualify for this period of exclusivity, a patent application ought
to have been filed and a patent granted for that product in another member and
marketing approval obtained in such a member. These special provisions will
provide protection similar to patent protection until the applicable transition period
has ended and patent protection then becomes available. As of 1999, India had
not passed implementing legislation or delineated procedures to accept
‘‘mailbox’’ applications, therefore the alternative requirement of the Agreement to
patent protection in the transitional period was violated.
3.2.4 Use without Authorization of the Right Holder
3.2.4.1 The Legality and Grounds of Compulory License
Comparing the language of the Paris Convention,87 the TRIPS Agreement never
mentions the phrase ‘‘compulsory license’’ throughout its text. Yet, Article 8 of
the Agreement constitutes the basis of legal justification for compulsory licence,
Article 27.2 explicitly allows the exception of patent, and Article 31 clarifies the
procedural safeguards of the grant and practice of use without the authorization of
the patent holder. Thus, Article 31 about the use without the authorization of the
rights holder is in substance analogous to the traditional term of compulsory
license. This Article in particular highlights that the private rights conferred by the
TRIPS Agreement are limited and qualified. They are subject to be over-ridden
by the public interest where necessary and appropriate. Therefore this part of the
Agreement shall be read together with the preamble and Part I, the rationale of
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which is to seek a good balance between private rights and public interest, and to
prevent the abuse of exclusive rights of patent holder.
There are no specific provisions concerning the grounds on which such licences
can be granted. Specific reference is made to the dependency of patents (i.e.
when an invention cannot be used without using another invention); to licences for
governmental non-commercial use; to cases of emergency use; and to remedy
anti-competitive practices. But licences may be granted also for other reasons.
Thus, nothing in the Agreement prevents, in effect, the granting of compulsory
licences for reasons such as public interest, public health or environmental
protection, subject to the conditions set out in the Agreement.
The legality of the compulsory license granted for the reason of public health was
reaffirmed and clarified by the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health adopted by the Doha Ministerial Conference.  It states that:88
Each member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to
determine the grounds upon which such licences are granted.
What’s more, the Declaration goes a step further by recognizing that the WTO
members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical
sector could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under
the TRIPS Agreement. Therefore, it instructed the Council for TRIPS to find an
expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the General Council before
the end of 2002.89
Compulsory license has special impact in the field of pharmaceutical patent. The
concern that the social and economic costs of introducing pharmaceutical patents
are likely to outweigh the benefits in the case of most developing countries
suggests a cautious approach to intellectual property protection in the area of
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pharmaceuticals. Since under the TRIPS Agreement member countries are bound
to provide such protection, compensatory measures and schemes to avoid the
negative impact of monopolization of drugs will need to be devised. Such
measures could include, for instance, appropriate compulsory licence systems
which facilitate the access to protected technologies and raw materials. In the new
framework for IPRs, this type of licence may be an important tool for preventing
anti-competitive practices and for persuading title-holders to grant voluntary
licences on reasonable commercial terms.
As a matter of fact, compulsory license widely exists in the domestic legislation
and practice. For instance, the U.S. can issue compulsory licenses to patented
products under the Clean Air Act,9 0  Nuclear Energy Act,9 1  for public health
purpose under the Bayh-Dole Act,9 2  as a measure for anti-competitive
practices under antitrust laws, and for government use. Under 28 USC Section
1498, the U.S. government can use patent or authorize third parties to use patents
for virtually any public use, without negotiation. Patent holders have no rights for
injunctive relief, and may only seek compensation, not as a tort, but as an eminent
domain taking. In the year of 2000, the U.S. issued several compulsory licenses
for tow truck technologies. The Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services makes the determination in cases involving the public health
under the Bayh-Dole Act. Also, in Canada, Australia, Ireland, Italy, Germany,
New Zealand and the U.K., public use provisions also provide very similar
powers, as several other countries do.
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3.2.4.2 Procedural Safeguards
Great efforts to seek a reasonable balance is illustrated by the procedural
requirements from Article 31 paragraphs a to l, which is a result of the negotiation
between developed countries and developing countries. The developing countries
lag behind in the technical development and concerned about the access to
essential products for the public interests like national security or public health.
While the developed countries lead the technical development and is concerned
about the profits of domestic industry, which is not only the private interest of the
right holder but also the national economic and trade benefit. Therefore, to weigh
the economic interest of the different parties through the provision of safeguards
against arbitrary compulsory licenses are the main task of this provision.
Article 31(f) provides that ‘‘any such use shall be authorized predominantly for
the supply of the domestic market of the member authorizing such use’’. One of
the discussions before the Doha Ministerial Conference was about the scope to
produce for export under compulsory licensing in order to supply a poor-country
market. This was considered important because many smaller developing
countries may want to use compulsory license for import rather than local
production. They argued that the language ‘‘predominately for the supply of
domestic market’’ does not absolutely exclude the supply outside the domestic
market. They called for the provisions to be interpreted leniently and compulsory
license to be used to develop local production — which they said is necessary for
public health and technology transfer — if a patent holder does not produce the
medicine in that country.
According to the general rule of treaty interpretation, as the language of the text is
vague, the provision shall be interpreted in the light of the purpose of compulsory
license, which is mainly for the protection of public interest or as a remedy to the
abuse of IPRs. Therefore, if a compulsory license is justified as a measure
respond to the public interest, e.g. to overcome the severe health crisis caused by
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HIV/AIDS in a member, there is no rationale to export a product made under
compulsory license if the health crisis is happening only within the territory of that
member. While if the crisis is of a regional character, and other small countries
may lack the capacity to produce such patent product locally, then the export as a
supply for foreign market is reasonable. The precondition is that the price and
scale of the export is not for the purpose of profit earning. Otherwise the effect of
exterritorial supply is not to fight against the health crisis but to redistribute the
profits generated by exclusive rights.
Another situation is that the compulsory license is made as a remedy for the abuse
of patent right, e.g. as an anti-competitive measure. Under this context, the
justification is not for the public interest but to promote the technical transfer and
sanction the abusive exercise of exclusive rights. In this case, the domestic supply
requirement in paragraph f should be waived.93
3.2.4.3 Compensation
Adequate remuneration to the right holder is provided in paragraph h as a further
condition of compulsory license. The concept ‘‘adequate’’ needs to be illustrated
by national law and practice. Legislation could limit the remuneration so as to
compensate, through a royalty calculated as a percentage of net sales, for the
costs actually incurred by the patentee in developing the invention, excluding the
subsidies or other contributions that the patentee may have received from third
parties or entities. The compensation may also be determined taking into account
the average royalties paid in the particular sector by licensees which are not under
the control of the licensor concerned.
There is a rich diversity of national approaches in terms of compensation in the
light of economic value of the authorization of the compulsory licensing. Japan,
                                                
93 In this situation, the procedural requirement in paragraph b could also be waived and the
‘‘adequate compensation’’ in paragraph h could be reconsidered.
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Germany, and the Philippines and other states have adopted various forms of
royalty guidelines for the calculation of compensation in this situation. Japan has
used rates from 2 to 4 per cent in the past, and Germany used 2 to 10 per cent.
Canada, which according to the World Health Organization (WHO) has the most
extensive use of compulsory licensing for pharmaceutical products, ordered
royalties around 4 per cent. In 1987, when Hoffmann-LaRoche requested a flat
fee royalty that would have amounted to 39 per cent of the price of Valium
before the emergence of generic competition, the Canadian Exchequer Court set
an ad valoream royalty of 4 per cent on sales after the emergence of generic
competition. The court provided that in setting the terms of the license and fixing
the amount of royalty or other consideration payable, the relative authority shall
have regard to the desirability of making the medicine available to the public at the
lowest possible price consistent with giving to the patentee due reward for the
research leading to the invention’’.94
The U.S. Patent Code includes provisions allowing the federal government to
infringe valid patent when infringement serves the national interest and reasonable
compensation is paid.95 The requirements for reasonable compensation have been
interpreted historically to imply much lower payments than the foregone monopoly
profits standard imposed in private patent infringement damages cases. In Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,
a majority of the Supreme Court ruled that Congress had exceeded its
constitutional powers in nullifying individual states’ sovereign immunity from patent
infringement suits in federal courts, provided that the states maintain their own in-
state legal procedures to ensure that the patent holders’ property is not taken
                                                
94 Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd v. Frank W. Horner Ltd., C.P.R. 107-108 (1979). See Scherer,
Fredric M., ‘‘the Economic Effects of Compulsory licensing’’, Monograph Series in
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without due process of law.96 Armed with that precedent, the states might in the
future seek to alleviate their escalating drug cost burdens under Medicaid by
setting up patent-infringing generic drug production operations or importing drugs
from no-patent jurisdictions and offering to pay ‘‘reasonable compensation’’ for
the use of the infringed patent. Compensation substantially less than the monopoly
profits foregone by the patent holders might arguably satisfy the due process
requirement.
Members of the TRIPS Agreement could design their own guidelines on this
issue. Whether the rate it should be manageable, there is no reason that the
TRIPS Agreement demands developing countries to pay more than the
developed countries do in their domestic practices.97 Like other issue in Article
31, the most important is to provide a fair process for reaching a reasonable
result. There is no question about the power of states to rein in patent right in
order to assure affordability and access. But in the process of doing so, the patent
holder shall provide sufficient evidence to claim the investment in R&D, the risk
costs, and the government shall take the burden to prove that allowed justification
and procedural safeguards provided in the Agreement have been met.98
                                                
96 Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 119 S.Ct.
2199 (1999).
97 Love, James, ‘‘Compulsory Licensing: Models For State Practice in Developing Countries,
Access to Medicine and Compliance with the WTO TRIPS Accord’’, paper prepared for
United Nations Development Programme (2001). Available at
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98 For example, the firms should disclose the actual costs invested in the development of
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3.2.4.4 Non-Discrimination in the Field of Technology
Read in conjunction with Article 27.1 of the Agreement, a sensitive issue related
to compulsory license is the discrimination in the field of technology. Article 27 of
the TRIPS Agreement states that patents shall be available and patent rights
enjoyable without discrimination as to the field of technology. So the compulsory
license shall also be non-discriminatory.99
A landmark case in this field is the lawsuit brought by a Pharmaceutical Industry
Association and 39 of its affiliate pharmaceutical companies against South Africa
regarding provisions of its Medicines and Related Substances Control
Amendment Act of 1997. This Act explicitly authorized parallel import and
compulsory license with the objective to remedy public health crisis. It granted the
Health Minister the power to act in the interest of public health by ensuring that
patent rights for any drug would not hinder South Africa government from issuing
a license to a third party to produce the same drug, the purpose of which is to
allow easier access to affordable drugs as a response to the HIV/AIDS crisis. It
also allowed both cheaper imports form drug producing countries and generic
substitution.
The complaint of the plaintiff was that the Act violated the right of the
pharmaceutical patent holder. They claimed that:100
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authorization of the right holder where authorization for such use was granted by the
government before the date this Agreement became known.’’
100 The Pharmaceutical Manufactures’ Association of South Africa, et all, v. the President
of the Republic of South Africa, the Honourable Mr. N.R. Mandela N. O., et all., High court
of South Africa, Case No. 4183/98 (1998).
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It is discriminatory in respect of the enjoyment of patent rights in the
pharmaceutical field which discrimination is in conflict with the provisions of
Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement, an international agreement binding the
Republic and to which Parliament has given effect by the promulgation of
the Intellectual Property Laws Amendments Act No.38 of 1997, and
consequently with Sections 231(2) and 231(3) of the Constitution.
The South Africa government’s correction of its policy, serious weakness in the
technical arguments of the plaintiffs together with strong pressure from domestic
and international public opinion resulted in the withdrawal of the case by
pharmaceutical companies. On 17 September 1999, the U.S. and South Africa
reached a common understanding on the relationship between pharmaceuticals
and public health. While both governments committed themselves to the TRIPS
Agreement, they nevertheless acknowledged the need to address the AIDS
epidemic as a public health emergency.
Although this case was settled without touching the issue of technological
discrimination, the problem was still going on. A recent WTO dispute raised the
discrimination issue again, which involved Canadian patent exceptions for
research and testing on generic drugs used for drug registration and a Canadian
patent exception that permitted stockpiling of production in anticipation of the
patent expiration.101 The plaintiff (EU) argued that:
Canada, by treating patent holders in the field of pharmaceutical inventions
by virtue of these provisions less favourable than inventions in all other fields
of technology, violated its obligations under Article 27.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement requiring patents to be available and patent rights enjoyable
without discrimination as to the field of technology.
                                                
101 Canada — Term of Paten Protection, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS170/AB/R
(18 September 2000).
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Canada referred to Article 32 (b) of the VCLT, which says the interpretation of
treaty terms ‘‘should not produce manifestly absurd or unreasonable results’’. It
argued that the adoption of the meaning of the Article 27.1 reflected under the
argument of the EU would clearly violate the rule of the VCLT. It would lead to a
requirement for ‘‘across-the-board’’ derogations from patent rights, thus
compelling exceptions where there was no practical need and reducing patent
protection more than was required in all areas save those in which a balancing
measure was actually required. Such an incongruous result would not be
consistent with the objectives of the Article 27.1 and the intent of Article 30. The
Agreement allows exceptions that are ‘‘limited’’ because they are not spread
across all sectors of technology. Therefore, the Canadian law respected the
objective, as reflected in the TRIPS Agreement, of ensuring balance, by avoiding
an anti-discrimination rule which would overwhelm other important societal
interests if it had to be applied ‘‘across the board’’, without regard for particular
circumstances.
Therefore, the argument of the EU deprived members of the ability to create
appropriate solutions for specific problems on a case-by-case (or a product-by-
product) basis, and instead obliged them to impose universally applicable
measures which could be entirely inappropriate in most context. It required
‘‘limited exceptions’’ to be unlimited.
On 17 March 2000 the WTO Panel report held that the Canadian provisions
were not violations of Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. However, this
decision seemed to be based largely on the fact that the legislation itself did not
specifically limit itself to the pharmaceutical industry, even though it was clear that
this was a primary area where the legislation was having an effect. The decision
includes language that declared the reasons for Article 27.1 was to prevent
countries from enacting compulsory licensing laws that dealt specifically with
pharmaceuticals. However, the Panel avoided an essential question: if the
legislation was particular on one technical field, e.g. pharmaceutical product,
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would it be discriminatory; or even if discriminatory, would it be permitted
discriminatory justified by the specific purpose.
In general, the issue of permitted discrimination in the field of the technology
seems to be an unanswered question even after the WTO decision in the case,
and pose perhaps the most difficult issue for the drafting of legislation by
members. All of the contractions and tension in the Canadian case was reserved,
so the substantive question will likely be revisited in the future. The U.S.
compulsory licensing laws for clean air and civilian nuclear energy are facing the
same difficulty. The recommendation of this thesis for members is, to adopt laws
that provide for compulsory licensing under a broader title like ‘‘health’’.
Confronting the challenge by other members before the WTO, they could
therefore make the argument that ‘‘health’’ is not a field of ‘‘technology’’, as
‘‘health’’ could be related to many technological fields.
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4 The Legal Implications of
Flexibility of the TRIPS
Agreement
4.1 The Status of the TRIPS Agreement in
Domestic Legal Systems
The legal status of international treaty in domestic legal systems relies on the
constitutional separation of powers and the nature of the treaty concerned. The
latter is further determined by the factors like the intent of the parties, the
constitutional separation of power and the justiciability of the treaty provisions, all
of which are reflected in the language of the treaty and the states’ legislation and
practice thereafter. This section will discuss the nature of the TRIPS Agreement
and its legal status in domestic legal systems. The analysis will illustrate how the
flexibility of the Agreement imposes important impacts on its nature and legal
status. Before going to the TRIPS Agreement, general discussion of the
international treaty in domestic legal systems will provide a logical premise.
4.1.1 The Status of Treaty in Domestic Legal Systems
As to the relationship between international treaty and domestic legal systems, the
first question is whether a treaty is a part of the legal order of a state as to enable
its direct application in the domestic court, or whether a specific act of
incorporation or transformation is necessary for its integration into the domestic
legal system. The second question is where there exists inconsistency between a
treaty and domestic law, which one prevails in domestic legal order?
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4.1.1.1 The Application of Treaty in Domestic Legal Systems
Theoretically, as to the relation between international treaty and domestic legal
systems, there are two doctrines known as monism and dualism. The monism
regards international treaty and domestic law as interrelated parts of a unitary
legal system. The dualism considers that international treaty and domestic law
constitute two separate and independent legal orders which coexist but differ as
to their subjects and sources; neither legal order has the power to establish or
alter the rules of the other. Therefore, for an international treaty to be invoked and
applied within the domestic courts, the state should perform a specific act of
incorporation, and then the treaty rules would be applied as part of national law
and not as international law.102
In the U.K, the ratification of treaty is a prerogative power belonging to the
executive authorities. The automatic application of treaty provisions may lead to
the result that the executive authorities could alter the British law without the
approval of Parliament, which is contrary to the basic principle of constitutional
law that Parliament has a monopoly of legislative power. Consequently, a treaty is
required to be transformed into domestic law by legislative enactment of
Parliament. An international treaty has no effect in domestic law until an act of
Parliament is passed to give effect to it.103
                                                
102 Brownlie, Ian, Principles of Public International Law,  5th edition (Clarendon: Oxford
University Press, 1998), p. 31-33.
103 There are limited exceptions to the requirement of parliamentary implementation: no
legislation is required for certain specific classes of treaties, namely, treaties modifying the
belligerent rights of the Crown when engaged in maritime warfare (presumably because such
treaties involve no major intrusion on the legislative domain of Parliament), and
administrative agreements of an informal character needing only signature, but not
ratification, provided they do not involve any alteration of municipal law. Significantly,
these exceptions appear to involve matters unlikely to become the subject of litigation
before common-law court. See Shearer, Ivan, Starke’s International Law, 11th edition
(London: Butterworths, 1994), p. 71-74.
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No act of transformation is necessary in countries such as the U.S., where the
Senate’s approval or a law of approval by the Congress is respectively necessary
for the ratification of treaty by the executive authorities. Once the treaty is
internationally in force, no other legislative act is necessary for it to become part
of American law. The supremacy clause gives treaty the character of municipal
law which is enforceable in domestic courts at the behest of private individuals.
Courts may consider a treaty equivalent to a legislative act when the treaty is self-
executing. Accordingly, the distinction between ‘‘self-executing’’ and ‘‘non-self-
executing’’ is decisive.104
Similarly, in Italy, it is not necessary to reproduce the rules of treaty, but an
‘‘order of performance’’ setting forth the intention that the treaty be performed
and applied at the domestic level is necessary. The Constitutional regulation of
Spain is similar as it provides, in Article 96 paragraph 1, that international treaties,
legally entered into, shall be a component for their application, ‘‘as the provided
formalities for becoming a component part of the domestic order upon their
official publication in Spain’’. No act of transformation is necessary as a
condition for the domestic application of treaties, ‘‘as the provided formalities for
becoming a component part of the domestic juridical system are deemed fulfilled
upon publication thereof’’.105 The French Constitution also sets up the criterion of
the automatic application of treaty, without the need of any other legislative act.106
In summary, the necessity for some formal domestic transformation depends upon
two factors principally:
a. The constitutional and administrative practice of a particular state:
                                                
104 See below section 4.112, p. 81.
105 Correa and Yusuf, see above note 22, p. 100.
106 Pinh, Nguyen Q., Daillier, Patrick, and Pellet, Alain, Droit International Public, 4th edition
(Paris: LGDJ, 1993), p. 224-225.
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(i) The transformation of a treaty into a domestic rule is required before it
becomes binding and applicable in domestic courts, as is the case of the
U.K., Ireland and Scandinavian countries, among others.
(ii) A treaty that are not inconsistent with the constitution binds the courts
without any specific act of incorporation, as is the case of the Argentina,
Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Greece, German, Spain, Mexico, the
Netherlands, Switzerland, and the U.S..107
b. The nature of the particular treaty:
In the countries like the U.S., no transformation is necessary. Domestic
application of a treaty is determined by its nature: self-executing or non-self-
executing. Self-executing treaties need no legislative implementation.
4.1.1.2 Nature of Treaty: Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing
In general, a ‘‘self-executing’’ treaty can be applied and enforced directly by the
courts without a prior legislative implementation. Conversely, a ‘‘non-self-
executing’’ treaty may not be enforced in the courts without prior legislative
implementation. It merely confers rights upon states or binds them to take
supplementary or regulatory steps to implement the agreement. Treaty rules
would not be effective by themselves and therefore may not be invoked by
individuals before domestic court. It is possible that in the same treaty some
provisions are self-executing while others are not. In the domestic courts of the
U.S., self-executing or non-self-executing of a treaty or a treaty provision
depends on the intent of the parties, the constitutional separation of power, and
the justiciability of the treaty provisions.
a. Intent
                                                
107 Brownlie, see above note 102, p. 31-56. See also  Shearer, see above note 103, p. 77-78. 
82
Traditionally, treaties were considered as direct source of rights and obligations of
states, which are the main or unique subjects on international law. Private parties
were not entitled to invoke them until the contracting parties supplemented the
treaty rules with domestic legislation. This conception was upheld by the
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the Dantzig Railway Official
Case.108 However, the PCIJ acknowledged that the intent of the states parties to
an international agreement could be that treaty is effectively a direct source of the
rights of private parties and could be invoked before domestic courts. Therefore,
considering the intent of the parties as reflected in the text of a treaty, a treaty or a
provision could be self-executing and a direct source of rights.
This doctrine is further explained by the domestic judicial decisions of the U.S.. In
Foster case, the court recognized that the general rule established by the
Supremacy Clause, under which treaties are enforceable in the courts without
prior legislative action, could be altered by the parties to the treaty through the
treaty itself. If the parties to the treaty agreed that the rights of the private parties
before domestic courts were to be affected only through future lawmaking acts of
the states parties — if they ‘‘stipulate for some future legislative act’’ — then the
treaty is not ‘‘operative of itself’’ and accordingly cannot be enforced by the
courts without prior legislation.
In certain situations, the U.S. courts went beyond the words of the relevant treaty
provision and relied on negotiating history and statements made during the
executive advice-and-consent process in determining whether a treaty is self-
executing or not. In some circumstance, the negotiators issued declarations
binding on courts, qualifying the treaty as non-self-executing. For example, in
recent years, the U.S. treaty-makers qualified its consent to the ratification of a
treaty with a declaration to the effect that the treaty shall not be used as a direct
source of law in the U.S. courts. These declarations have been attached to
                                                
108 Danzig Railway Official Case, Report of PICJ (1928), Series B., No. 5.
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treaties that would clearly not otherwise be wholly non-self-executing. The
unilateral declarations reflected the views of the President and two-thirds of the
Senate, and have been used in respect of human rights treaties and economic
agreements.109
b. Constitutionality: Constitutional Separation of Powers
The constitutional systems of the states also determine whether the executive or
the legislature power shall enact the implementation rules to enable the application
of treaties. In some countries it is usually for parliaments to legislate on
international trade issues and to allocate rights of private parties, while
international treaties are generally negotiated and ratified by the executive
authorities without an active role of legislation. The treaty-makers (executive
authorities) may bypass the law-makers by lifting a subject matter from the
national to the international sphere. Therefore if the treaty-makers make a treaty
in the regime of the law-makers’ power, this treaty is non-self-executing because
of the treaty-makers’ constitutional disability, and its enforcement in the domestic
courts requires an implementation act of the legislative power.
For example, if the relevant treaty deals with a subject matter in which the
U.S. Congress has an exclusive legislative power, the treaty will be considered as
prima facie non-executing, irrespective of what the intention of the parties is
claimed to be.110 Courts sometimes consider the subject matter of a treaty to be
relevant as it reflects the allocation of power. Treaties which purport to raise
revenue, make conduct criminal and appropriate money are considered to fall into
the power of law-makers but not the treaty-makers, so these treaties are non-
                                                                                                                           
109 For example, such a declaration was attached to the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, GA RES No. 39/46, adopted
on 10 December 1984.
110 Shearer, see above note 103, p. 74-78.
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self-executing. Treaties of friendship, commerce, extradition and navigation fall
within the power of the treaty-makers and are considered to be self-executing.
c. Justiciability
Justiciability refers to whether a treaty is judicially enforceable by private parties in
domestic courts. Treaties are enforceable in the courts only if they impose
obligations. Some treaties do not impose obligations but, instead, set forth
aspirations. Domestic courts have found that such treaties are not judiciable,
because if a treaty does not impose an obligation on the defendant to treat the
plaintiff in a given way, it does not give the plaintiff a correlative right to be
treated. These kinds of treaties are non-self-executing.
How to draw a line between the precatory treaty and obligatory treaty is a matter
of domestic law that allocates enforcement responsibility between the courts and
the legislature. In the separated power systems, a precatory treaty is a political
task not for the courts to perform. Therefore, in this case, the judiciability of the
treaty is not decided by the intent of the parties or negotiators, but by the
separation-of-power reasons. Justiciability is similar to the constitutionality in that
both require judgment about the allocation of the power. The constitutionality
requires a judgment about the distribution of the power to accomplish certain
ends between the treaty-makers and the law-makers. Justiciability requires a
judgment about the distribution of the power to enforce particular types of treaty
provisions between the courts and the legislature.
Justiciability of a treaty is reflected in many factors. A treaty may be judiciable to
private parties when it prescribes a rule by which the rights of private parties can
be determined.111 The justiciability also depends on whether the treaty is ‘‘too
                                                
111 Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Case), 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1984).
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vague for judicial enforcement’’,112 or ‘‘provides specific standards’’,113 or is
‘‘phrased in broad generalities’’,114 or ‘‘language of a broad and general
nature’’.115 In American Baptist Churches v Meese case,116 the court held that
Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relating to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War was not a self-executing treaty provision
because ‘‘the language used does not impose any specific obligations on the
signatory nations’’ and ‘‘the lack of precision deprived the court of any intelligible
guidelines for judicial enforcement.’’
4.1.1.3 The Inconsistency between Treaty and Domestic Law
After a treaty achieves the application in domestic law, the next question is, if
there exists a conflict between the treaty and domestic law, which one prevails.
The supremacy clause in the U.S. constitution declares that all treaties shall be the
law of the land and have equal standing with domestic law.117 By virtue of that
clause, treaties prevail over earlier domestic laws in case of a conflict. By the
same token, however, when a subsequent legislation enacted by the Congress
modifies or is inconsistent with a treaty in force, the subsequent legislation
prevails. That is the ‘‘last-in-time rule’’.118
 
                                                
112 People of Saipan v united States Dep’t of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 99 (9th Cir. 1974), cert
denied, 420 U.S. 1003(1975).
113 Diggs v Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851(D.C. Cir. 1976).
114 Frolova v USSR, 761 F. 2d 370, 374 (7th Cir. 1985). The court concluded that such a
language ‘‘suggested that (the articles of the treaty) are declarations of principles, not a
code of legal rights’’.
115 United States v Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 799 (S.D.Fla. 1992).
116 American Baptist Churches v Meese, 712 F. Supp. 756, 770 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
117 The United States Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2.
118 Correa and Yusuf, see above note 22, p. 101.
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Other countries adhere to the supremacy of treaty over domestic law even the
latter is made after the entry into force of the former. In the U.K., where a statute
contains provisions which are unambiguously inconsistent with those of an earlier
treaty, a British Court must apply the statute in preference to the treaty. However,
where the statute is ambiguous, a presumption arises that Parliament did not
intend to legislate contrary to the Queen’s international obligations under a treaty,
and the court may look into the treaty for the purpose of interpreting the
ambiguous statutory language, notwithstanding that the statute does not
specifically incorporate or refer to the treaty.119 The French constitution provides
that treaties when duly ratified or approved shall on publication have an authority
superior to domestic laws, even if the laws were enacted after the treaty entered
into force, subject to the reciprocity.120 The constitution of the Netherlands
provides that statutory provisions shall not apply if their application would be
incompatible with self-executing treaty provisions or resolutions of international
institutions.
4.1.2 Nature and Legal Status of the TRIPS Agreement in
Domestic Legal Systems
This sector will apply the factors determining the nature of a treaty to the TRIPS
Agreement: the intent of parties or negotiators, the constitutional separation of
power, and the justiciability. These factors are reflected in the language of the
Agreement as well as the related domestic practices.
                                                
119 Shearer, see above note 103, p. 67-74.
120 See Article 55 of the Constitution of France, which reads as follows: ‘‘Duly ratified or
approved treaties or agreements shall, upon their publication, override laws, subject, for
each agreement or treaty, to its application by the other party.’’
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Article 1 of the TRIPS Agreement on the ‘‘nature and scope of obligations’’
provides that:
 Members shall give effect to the provisions of this Agreement. Members
may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive
protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that such
protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement. Members
shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the
provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice.
The Agreement grants its members the freedom to introduce flexibility to those
rights under very broad terms and conditions, just as analysed in chapter 2. States
are able to introduce measures to prevent IPRs abuse to avoid trade or
competitive distortions and to establish exceptions to those exclusive rights, in
addition to those exceptions expressly contemplated in the Agreement. The extent
and scope of such measures are flexible and depend on the policy choice of
members, which must be made in the light of the basic principles and objectives
set forth in preamble and Part I of the Agreement. Under these circumstance, the
exclusive rights that members are committed to acknowledge through their
national IPRs systems are not ab-initio self-executing in national courts. The
courts will necessarily consider the extent and scope of the exclusive rights as
broadly embodied in the TRIPS Agreement, with reference to the flexibility
inherent in the provisions.
The ambiguous language or general concepts referred to by the TRIPS
Agreement in several instance needs to be defined or spelt out in more detail by
domestic law. Nevertheless, certain standards and principles of TRIPS might
have a ‘‘direct effect’’ on private parties who might, depending on the
constitutional system of the member concerned, seek their judicial enforcement by
domestic courts. These might be the TRIPS provisions establishing the term of
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protection of the different categories of industrial property,121 or provisions listing
the effects arising from copyright, industrial designs or patent. Though members
are free under these provisions to establish a longer term of protection under their
domestic legislations, no further action by national legislators is needed for these
standards to have a direct effect on private parties.
In this context, it is not an easy task to assert whether the members conceived the
TRIPS Agreement as a whole or in part as a non-self-executing agreement. The
national practices and legislation, especially carried out by the U.S. and the EU
who were main promoters of the Agreements, might have a certain impact on
other members.
Starting with the Trade Agreements Acts of 1979, which approved the GATT
Tokyo Round accords, and continuing with the acts approving and implementing
the US-Israel and the US-Canada Free Trade Area Agreements, there are
included provisions which deny the creation of private rights of action under the
agreements (except as explicitly provided for)’’.122 These provisions therefore
purport to deny the self-executing character of the trade agreements. Similarly,
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, which approved the agreements
concluded in the framework of the Uruguay Round negotiations of GATT and
modified the domestic legislation related to IPRs in order to adapt it to the TRIPS
Agreement, also deny the self-executing of trade agreements.123 Section 102(b),
which is devoted to adjust the relationship of the Uruguay Round Agreements and
the state law, provides that no person other than the United States:
                                                
121 For example, Article 33 of the TRIPS Agreement.
122 Correa and Yusuf, see above note 22, p. 109.
123 The Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 108 STAT, 4809-5053, Public Law 103-465-DEC.8
(1994).
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(A) shall have any cause of action or defence under any of the Uruguay Round
Agreements or by virtue of congressional approval of such an agreement,
or
(B) may challenge, in any action brought under any provision of law, any action
or in action by any department, agency, or other instrumentality of the
United States, any State, or any political subdivision of a state on the
ground  that such action or inaction in inconsistent with such agreement.
What’s more, as to the potential conflict between Uruguay Round Agreement
provisions and U.S. law, the U.S. Statement of Administrative Action to the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act asserts that the U.S. statute is intended not to
conflict with the agreements themselves.124 However, where a conflict cannot be
avoided, the U.S. courts are legally bound to follow the later statutory law. The
Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994 also reinforces the supremacy of later
domestic law by establishing that nothing in the Act shall be construed ‘‘to amend
or modify any law of the United States unless specifically provided for this
Act’’.125 Neither the provisions of the Uruguay Round Agreements nor the
application of any such provision to any person that is inconsistent with any law of
the U.S. shall have effect.126
The TRIPS Agreement and the other Uruguay Round Agreements constitute a
mere confirmation of the U.S. practice as regards international treaties,
particularly trade agreements, which are considered to be non-self-executing.
Against this context, in the domestic courts of the U.S., provisions of the trade
agreements, particularly those of the GATT and WTO, have received scant
attention in trade cases.
                                                
124 Statement of Administrative Action (SAA), H. R. Doc. 316, 103d Cong., 2nd Series, Vol. I1,
B(1)(d), p. 13.
125 19 USC 3512 § 102(a)(2)(A) and (B).
126 19 USC 3512 § 102(a)(1).
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The case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) rejected the direct effect of
GATT rules in the EU, basically due to the vagueness and elasticity of many of its
provisions. The nature of the rules and their wording is not operative. As stated
by the ECJ, the main reason to deny the direct effect of the GATT is that the
negotiation was undertaken on the basis of reciprocal and mutually advantageous
arrangement, which is characterized by the great flexibility in its provisions, in
particular those conferring the possibility of derogation. The court also
emphasised the reliance on consultation mechanisms to settle conflicts between
the contracting parties and the possibility of withdrawing concessions by
contracting states as additional reasons for the lack of direct effect of the GATT.
It is difficult to predict whether the ECJ would apply the same principles or
reasoning contained in its decisions regarding the application of the TRIPS
Agreement despite the differences that exist between the GATT and the TRIPS
Agreement. It must be noted that the ECJ characterized TRIPS as an agreement
setting a minimum level of IPRs protection,127 member countries are free to
implement more extensive protection and to determine the most appropriate
method of giving effect to its provisions.128 One may understand this statement as
supporting that basically, the TRIPS Agreement is a non-self-executing treaty that
confers a significant degree of discretion on the competent authorities to
implement it and to spell out in more detail the concepts which are not defined or
vaguely referred to in the text of the Agreement.
Therefore, the legislations and the court decisions of the members have further
confirmed the non-self-executing nature of the TRIPS Agreement. Even in certain
area where it seems to be self-executing, judging from its language, the domestic
                                                
127 Opinion1/94, adopted on 15 November 1994. The Court maintained that ‘‘The TRIPS
Agreement seeks to establish a minimum level of protection of intellectual property’’.
128 The TRIPS Agreement, Article 1(1).
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practices also render it non-self-executing according to some factors other than
the language itself. At the same time, when there exists a conflict between the
TRIPS Agreement and the domestic law, the supremacy of domestic law in
domestic court is preserved.
4.2 State Responsibility under the TRIPS
Agreement
Sector 4.1 discussed the nature of the TRIPS Agreement in domestic legal order.
The fact that a domestic court may not apply the Agreement directly and give a
priority to domestic law in no way affects the international obligation of the state
conferred by the Agreement. A domestic court which refers to domestic law,
notwithstanding an inconsistent rule of international law, itself acts in breach of
international law, and will, as an organ of the state, engage the international
responsibility of that state. Hence, before an international tribunal, a respondent
state cannot plead that its domestic law contains rules which conflict with
international law, nor can it plead the absence of any legislative provision or of a
rule of internal law as a defence to a charge that it has broken the international
law.129 This may even import a duty upon a state to pass the necessary legislation
to fulfil its international obligations. To this extent, the primacy of international
treaties is preserved before international tribunals.
The non-self-executing nature of the TRIPS Agreement determines that private
parties cannot invoke the Agreement as source of law in domestic courts. What
they can rely on is only the implementation legislation. However, if there is some
inconsistency between the implementation and the treaty provisions, private
parties cannot bring a lawsuit against the state on the basis of the TRIPS
Agreement. What a state violates is not the rights of private parties or its domestic
                                                
129 VCLT, Article 27.
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law obligation, but the international obligation under the treaty. Therefore it falls
into the regime of ‘‘state responsibility’’. In this section, it is argued that even in
the regime of international obligation, the flexibility of the TRIPS Agreement also
imposes a great impact on the realization of state responsibility of the members.
Again, general international rule on state responsibility provides the premise of the
argument.
4.2.1 The Role of Governments in Claims under the TRIPS
Agreement
International law is unconcerned about the means, but not unconcerned about the
results. The incompatibility between domestic law and international obligations
engages the international responsibility of the defaulting state. International law
prevails over domestic law and a state cannot plead that its domestic law
exonerate it from performing obligations imposed by an international treaty,
except in the exceptional case provided for in Article 46(1) of the VCLT. This
exception is that, in giving its consent to an international treaty, fundamental rule of
domestic law concerning constitutional competence to conclude the treaty
concerned was broken and this breach of domestic constitutional law was
manifest. In any event, the acts of the legislature or implementing regulations of
state authorities as well as the judicial decisions, may not be considered as acts of
some third party for which the state is not responsible. States may depend on
their constitutional systems and enact subsequent legislations which supersede
prior treaty obligations in domestic court, on the grounds that treaties as well as
statues are parts of the law of the land and consequently the ‘‘latter-in-time rule’’
will prevail. Though such a statute will be lawful under domestic law, it will engage
the international responsibility of the enacting state, which may not be exonerated
from the violation of its international obligations or from the consequence
stemming from such a violation.
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As to the state responsibility, the subject who possesses the right to claim state
responsibility is the state of which the victim is a national. The tribunal who can
settle this dispute is not the domestic court but the international tribunal appointed
by the treaty. Under the TRIPS Agreement, it is the DSB of the WTO who has
the competence to settle the disputes between members.
To make an inter-state claim is the right of a state, but not a duty. That means, a
state has the freedom to decide whether or not to seek a negotiation with the
violating state under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, to seek a friendly-
settlement, or to bring the dispute to the DSB. However, a state does not act as a
representative of private parties who are the victims of the IPRs violations. It acts
in its own name and for its own benefit. A state will not necessarily struggle for the
benefit of the alleged victims if it is inconsistent with the general good of a state, or
if the alleged victims do not have sufficient lobby power. In many circumstance,
states sacrifice the interest of private parties to seek the trade-off in other sectors
or merely to keep a balance with total benefit. One of the key problems was the
pursuit of appropriate economic policies for the benefit of the whole state or other
political or economic interest groups.
Therefore, the realization of state responsibility sometimes relies on political
pressures to determine whether to pursue violations of the Agreement.
Understandably, a state will not spend its limited resource on the trade problems
that have little impact on the domestic economy. Before embarking on an inter-
state claim, states will weigh the impact of the violation on certain industries, the
political clout of those industries, and pressures from other domestic
constituencies.
A state could decide not to bring a case against a particular state for political
reasons or because other domestic interest would prefer to keep the law
unchanged. Furthermore, intergovernmental pressure may result in cases not being
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brought to the international adjudicatory body. For instance, the EU initially
lodged a complaint within the WTO, which has repeatedly postponed the issue to
allow the EU and the U.S. sufficient time to negotiate. There is no doubt that
domestic pressure in the U.S. has led to the U.S. placing pressure on the EU not
to pursue the case. In this way, the trade organization has become politicalized.
Rather than adjudicating appropriate restrictions on trade, the forum is more or
less hijacked by the domestic pressure and politics. Therefore, the realization of
state responsibility under the TRIPS Agreement is as flexible as the Agreement
itself, which is more of a political than of a legal matter.
4.2.2 The Involvement of Private Parties
The non-self-executing nature of the TRIPS Agreement determines that the
Agreement has no direct effect on private parties, and private parties has no
legal standing in the dispute settlement process. The evolvement of the private
parties in the implementation and enforcement of the Agreement is indirect. The
extent of the evolvement depends on the lobby power of the private parties
concerned.
Examples of this would be the U.S. negotiation with Japan to open its
automobile market or the negotiation with Russia regarding regional investment.
Under the TRIPS Agreement, if a company in the U.S. feels that another state is
violating the provisions, it must petition the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)
according to the Section 301 procedure in order to pursue a judicial remedy.
The USTR must then make a decision as to whether it is worth the time and
energy to pursue a remedy through the WTO.
This procedure probably operates very well for the strong companies like
Kodak and IBM. But if the company affected by the violations is relatively small,
lacks political influence or power, or has not suffered large losses, the USTR
could, legitimately, conclude that out of the numerous trade violations it adjusts
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because of the limitation of resources. The USTR’s decisions have not been
reviewed by the judiciary, therefore a private actor seeking dispute resolution of
his claim in this manner will likely have no recourse if the USTR decides to take
no action.
4.3 The Limitation of Competence of the DSB
4.3.1 Competence of the DSB
The WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes creates a dispute settlement body composed of all WTO
members. Article 1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement grants the members freedom to
choose the method to implement the Agreement in their domestic legal systems.
However, it is not the member but the DSB who is the final arbiter to judge
whether or not the domestic implementation of a member complies with
agreement obligations. In the India Mailbox case, while the Appellate Body
agreed that India could choose its method of implementation, it strongly rejected
the contention that India was the final arbiter of whether or not the system of
administrative instructions complied with obligations under Article 70.8. The
Appellate Body stated that in order to determine whether India met its Article
70.8 obligations, the Panel did not have to decide or otherwise improperly delve
into Indian law, but merely had to perform an assessment as to whether or not
India’s law and practices were in line with the obligations in the TRIPS
Agreement.  The Appellate Body was adamant that DSB of the WTO had the
right to make such an assessment.  It held that the Panel did not perform any
improper interpretation of Indian law, because:
 
in this case, the Panel was not interpreting Indian law ‘‘as such’’; rather, the
Panel was examining Indian law solely for the purpose of determining
whether India had met its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement.  To say
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that the Panel should have done other-wise would be to say that only India
can assess whether Indian law is consistent with India’s obligations under
the WTO Agreement. This, clearly, cannot be so.
That means, the panel or Appellate Body established under the DSU of the WTO
has the competence to interpret the TRIPS Agreement and to decide on the
compliance of the implementation of the members.
4.3.2 ‘‘Good Faith’’ Rule and Limitation of Competence
However, the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement made by the DSB should
be in good faith according to the VCLT130. In the India Mailbox case, the Panel
relied on Article 31 of the VCLT in making its decision that ‘‘good faith
interpretation requires the protection of legitimate expectations derived from the
protection of intellectual property rights provided for in the Agreement.’’ In
contrast, the Appellate Body attacked the Panel’s reading of ‘‘good faith
interpretation’’ as requiring a broad inquiry into the expectations of parties, a task
that to a great degree involves reverse engineering, i.e. taking a treaty provision
and abstracting from it the expectations that likely underlie it.  The Appellate
Body believed that the Panel went too far in interpreting the meaning of
‘‘legitimate expectations’’ and strayed too far from the text of the agreement. It
stated that: 
The Panel misunderstands the concept of legitimate expectations in the
context of the customary rules of interpretation of public international law. 
The legitimate expectations of the parties to a treaty are reflected in the
language of the treaty itself.  The duty of a treaty interpreter is to examine
                                                
130 Article 31.1 of the VCLT establishes what has been described as the ‘‘good faith rule’’ of
interpretation: ‘‘ A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in according with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose.’’ See above note 47.
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the words of the treaty to determine the intentions of the parties.  This
should be done in accordance with the principles of treaty interpretation set
out in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.  But these principles of
interpretation neither require nor condone the imputation into a treaty of
words that are not there or the importation into a treaty of concepts that
were not intended.
Thus ‘‘good faith’’ interpretation does not include the assessment of the legitimate
expectations of parties unless these expectations are grounded in the language of
the treaty. The Appellate Body thus dismissed an unbounded analysis of the
legitimate expectations of the parties to the TRIPS Agreement, an endeavour that
would be subjective and mutable (and not in good faith) if not focused on the
language of the Agreement.  An analysis of legitimate expectations is a necessary
component of the treaty interpretation, but only in as far as the expectations are
expressed in the wording of the treaty.  This holding characterized the tone of the
decision of the Appellate Body. In contrast to the Panel, it focused much more on
flat, formalistic treaty interpretation and looked less to the ‘‘softer’’ side of the
expectations underlying treaty obligations.
                  The ‘‘good faith’’ rule of interpretation limits the competence of the DSB in that
its interpretation of the Agreement is valid only in so far as it is grounded in the
language of the Agreement. Where there is no language basis or the language is
flexible, the DSB could not add new obligations on the members through an
expanding interpretation. Interpretation is not a process of law-marking. The
problems unresolved by the Ministers could not find answer in expert bodies.
Domestic courts decline to adjudicate claims based on vague treaty provisions of
constitutional clauses needing further definition or implementation by the legislature
or administrative agencies. The same applies to the DSB of the WTO, including
the panel and Appellate Body. They shall not clarify or judge on the flexible issues
which have not been clarified by the trade negotiations or subsequent agreements.
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This is the limitation of the competence of the DSB in the process of treaty
interpretation, which is another legal implication of the flexibility of the TRIPS
Agreement.
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5 Conclusion and Proposal
IPRs protect the private rights of IPRs holder through the rewards to creative
work and investment guaranteed by exclusive rights. The protection of IPRs also
generates public benefit by promoting technology development and economic
prosperity. On the other hand, IPRs give rise to customer loss and social cost.
The realization of the benefit of IPRs protection depends on the economic and
social condition of different countries, and the benefit of IPRs may be offset by
the social cost. High level IPRs protection has different effects to the North and
South. What leads to a suitable choice of IPRs policy is the balance of public
interest and private rights, as well as the proper assessment of domestic
developing level within a certain period.
However, after the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement, the freedom of members
to make their own policy choice in the regime of IPRs decreases as the result of
the substantive harmonization of the Agreement. Since the TRIPS Agreement is
there and domestic legislators cannot ignore their international obligations, what
can the developing and least developed countries do is to exploit the flexibility
inherent in the Agreement. The objective of flexible interpretation and application
of the Agreement is not to escape the international obligations, but to seek more
freedom of domestic IPRs policy for the purpose of the long-term economic
development and public welfare, provided that the exploitation is not inconsistent
with the Agreement. As analysed in this thesis, the flexible interpretation and
application in many aspects of IPRs protection, especially in patent protection, is
consistent with the purpose and principle of the Agreement. In some vertical
dimensions with regard to patent protection, several crucial legal notions are left
undefined so that domestic legislators have the room to clarify them according to
their own national interest.
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The exploitation of the flexibility of the TRIPS Agreement mainly occurs in the
process of national implementation. However, the legality of the exploitation has
met the challenge of developed country members. Therefore, the realization of the
flexibility is factually uneasy although theoretically possible. The pressure imposed
by the U.S. on Argentina when it sought to invoke the transitional period of the
patent protection, and the law suit brought against South Africa when it attempted
to resolve its public health crisis through the measure of compulsory license,
illustrated the difficulty in the exploitation of the flexibility of the TRIPS
Agreement. Unilateral sanctions and threat of sanction still exist and affect the
policy choice of the members whose trade and economic power are relatively
weak. So it is a reasonable fear that the TRIPS Agreement may be implemented
in the same way as it was negotiated. However, the arguments in the present
thesis in favour of the flexible interpretation and application devote themselves to
strengthen the legal power of the developing and least developed country
members. For the purpose of further recognition and realization of the flexibility of
the TRIPS Agreement, several proposals are set out as following:
Firstly, the multilateral dispute settlement mechanism under WTO is an
appropriate and competent forum to resolve the disputes related with the
interpretation and application of the Agreement. Although the ICJ is appointed by
pre-TRIPS IPRs conventions as the dispute settlement body, this channel has
never been used. Therefore, before the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement,
unilateral sanctions had been frequently used by developed countries to remedy
the alleged IPRs violations and to enforce the strong protection of IPRs.
However, with the inclusion of trade-related IPRs issues in the framework of the
WTO, trade sanctions in this area can only be taken in so far as the retaliation has
been authorized by the WTO. Therefore, unilateral trade sanction is inconsistent
with the WTO rule.
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Before the possible authorization of retaliation by the WTO, developing and least
developed country members could bring the case in front of the panels and appeal
before the Appellate Body. As the independent expert bodies, the panels and
Appellate Body shall interpret the Agreement according to the general principle
and custom of international law, which is consolidated in the VCLT. The balance
of public interest and private rights indicated in the preamble and Part I of the
Agreement, together with other related or subsequent agreements, shall be taken
into account. If the treaty provisions are vague or ambiguous in certain issues,
flexible interpretation and application shall be allowed for the public interest of
members, e.g. to resolve the public health crisis, provided that they are consistent
with the Agreement. ‘‘Non-violation complaints’’ and ‘‘legitimate exceptions’’ of
the developed countries without express language basis in the Agreement would
not be supported. Therefore, the developing and least developed country
members shall realize the advantage of multilateral dispute settlement mechanism
and make full use of it to justify the exploitation of the flexibility of the TRIPS
Agreement.
Secondly, the TRIPS Agreement is a living instrument instead of a static legal
document. Article 71 of the Agreement provides the review and amendment of
the Agreement. It states that:
1. The Council for TRIPS shall review the implementation of this Agreement
after the expiration of the transitional period referred to in paragraph 2 of
Article 65. The Council shall, having regard to the experience gained in its
implementation, review it two years after that date, and at identical intervals
thereafter. The Council may also undertake reviews in the light of any
relevant new developments which might warrant modification or
amendment of this Agreement.
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2. Amendments merely serving the purpose of adjusting to higher levels of
protection of intellectual property rights achieved, and in force, in other
multilateral agreements and accepted under those agreements by all
Members of the WTO may be referred to the Ministerial Conference for
action in accordance with paragraph 6 of Article X of the WTO Agreement
on the basis of a consensus proposal from the Council for TRIPS.
To modify or amend the Agreement is difficult because it is almost impossible to
achieve a consensus for a new proposal. However, the review of the
implementation by the TRIPS Council shall be undertaken in the light of any new
developments in the fields of the IPRs. Therefore, in assessing whether or not a
national implementation is consistent with the Agreement, the Council shall take
into consideration the development of the related issues, including the issues
clarified by the subsequent WTO documents. A latest example in the field of
patent is the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.
The Declaration reaffirmed ‘‘the right of WTO members to use, to the full, the
provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for the purpose (of
public health)’’. These flexibilities include:131
a. In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international law,
each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the
object and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its
objectives and principles.
b. Each member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to
determine the grounds upon which such licences are granted.
c. Each member has the right to determine what constitutes a national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood
that public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis,
                                                
131 See above note 56, para 5.
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malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency.
d. The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to the
exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each member free to
establish its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge, subject to
the MFN and national treatment provisions of Articles 3 and 4.
Although not an international treaty itself, the Declaration serve as the context of
the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement as it is a subsequent agreement
between the WTO members. Therefore, in the review of the implementation by
the TRIPS Council, measures taken in the regime of the flexibility clarified by the
Declaration shall be considered as proper implementation of the Agreement.
Thirdly, the WTO is not isolated from the context of public international law. In
many disputes resolved by the DSB, e.g. Thailand — Restrictions on
Importation of and International Taxes on Cigarettes case, and US – Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products case, international health
law and environmental law were respected by the DSB. Therefore, a third
proposal of this thesis is that the developing and least developed country
members shall cooperate with each other and actively lobby the UN specialized
agencies such as WHO and UN High Commissioner of Human Rights
(UNHCHR). Through the resolutions adopted by these institutions, public interest
such as the rights to health and culture will seek higher legal and moral status, and
a general context of public international law could be created in the favour of the
developing and least developed countries.
As a matter of fact, the settlement of the South African compulsory license case
relied heavily on the campaign of the non-governmental organizations, the
pressure of public opinion, and the moral conviction. The adoption of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health was subsequent to
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the South Africa case, promoted by the workshop established by the WTO and
WHO, and motivated by the general recognition of the right to health in the
international community.
Developing and least developed countries have the majority of votes in the UN
and its specialized agencies. Because of the similar developing level and social
situation, if they are to avoid the profound North-South imbalance and to make
an effective contribution to the creation of favourable legal context in international
law, they need to put forward joint views in the UN and its specialized agencies.
Through the establishment of a common strategy and co-ordination of their action,
they can make full use of their numeral advantage, which is helpful to create a
suitable context of international law and strengthen the respect of public interest in
international community. Under such a context, the exploitation of the flexibility of
the TRIPS Agreement will be legally and morally easier.
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